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1 Introduction
Securitization is the main channel transforming the U.S. subprime housing market de-
cline into a global credit crisis. Those subprime mortgage loans are first packaged into
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which are then repackaged into collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs). Those CDOs, mostly bearing AAA credit ratings, are either kept
on the investment banks’ balance sheet, or insured by credit default swaps (CDS), or sold
to investors all over the world. Securitization was the biggest U.S. export to the world in
the 21st century till the crisis broke out in August 2007.1 After the crisis, international
investors, especially those from high savings countries such as China, are blamed to be
the root cause of the crisis. The critics claim that U.S. asset demand directed capital
inflows drove global imbalance, fueled the real estate bubble, and facilitated excessive
consumption.2 Such claims are crucially based on the asset demand assumption. How-
ever, it is an empirical issue to determine the specific roles of the demand side and the
supply side. Were capital flows into securitization market pulled or pushed? In this pa-
per we investigate household investment decisions in structured products using unique
data from Hong Kong.
Household finance behavior could provide microfoundation for macroeconomic fluc-
tuations (see Mian and Sufi (2009) for leverage choice). Investment patterns at individ-
ual investor level prior to the crisis is important to understand the root causes of the
crisis. The crisis reveals that CDOs were, to a large extent, poor investment choice.
Practitioners, academics, and regulators have quickly reached a rare consensus on the
detrimental role of CDOs in the economy. However, CDOs are merely a financial inno-
vation subject to market selection. One adverse realization of investment return does
not totally disprove their usefulness as an investment tool. After all, investors seemingly
had non-satiable appetite for CDOs and other structured products prior to the crisis
as evidenced by the flourish of such markets. Did investors understand the risk-return
profiles of those investments when investing in them?
Individual investors’ appetite for structured products is puzzling from several as-
1“Evil Wall Street Exports Boomed With ‘Fools’ Born to Buy Debt”, Bloomberg.com, August 27,
2008.
2“Paulson says crisis sown by imbalance,” Financial Times, January 1, 2009. “. . . it is impossible
to understand this crisis without reference to the global imbalances . . . ” Ben S. Bernanke, Speech at
the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., March 10, 2009. Curbing global imbalance is the
main agenda of the G-20 meetings in November, 2009. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) develop a
model to show how global imbalance has driven the US securitization boom and bust. Other references
include Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) and Jagannathan, Kapoor, and Schaumburg (2009).
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pects. First, a security will be included in an investor’s portfolio only if it is on the
efficient frontier (see Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2009) for a review of portfolio
theories). However, evidence from U.S., U.K., Germany, Swiss, among others, shows
that structured products are massively overpriced.3 Second, structured products are
financial innovations with little historical performance data and much ambiguity. Ambi-
guity averse investors would avoid such investments. Third, CDOs and other structured
products have capped returns but substantial downside due to default risk. Such feature
does not match investors’ preference for positive skewness (Barberis and Huang (2008),
Kumar (2009)).
One potential explanation for individual investors’ seemingly suboptimal investments
in structured products is that investors misunderstood them and simply followed the
fads. Taken for granted the disadvantage of investing in structured products, the re-
maining question is whether the investment mistakes were made by investors themselves
(investment was ”pushed” by investors) or induced by the product issuers (investment
was “pulled” by issuers). It is no surprise that bounded rational investors make subopti-
mal investment decisions (Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007)). Individual investment
practice is constrained by transaction costs, information processing capacity, and liquid-
ity shocks. However, even perfectly informed investors may rebel conventional wisdoms.
DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) show that a naive 1/N rule outperforms sophis-
ticated mean-variance optimization strategies in historical data. On the other hand,
CDOs could be mis-sold to investors by investment banks and other financial intermedi-
aries (Inderst and Ottaviani (2009)). It is important to distinguish these two alternatives
(investor mistake or mis-selling) for security design and market regulation.
Empirical study of investments in retail structured products is difficult as investors
are hard to identify. Obtaining such information from brokers or banks is unrealistic
for confidentiality reasons. It is commonly believed that CDOs are only sold to institu-
tional investors. However, it was revealed through the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008 that individual investors in Asia (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore
in particular) have invested in CDOs disguised under other names from local bank dis-
tributors in retail structured products market. Thousands of individuals bought “mini-
bonds”, a type of credit-linked notes (CLN), issued by Lehman Brothers from 2003 to
2008. Many bought “constellation”, CLN referencing Lehman Brothers, issued by De-
velopment Bank of Singapore (DBS) in 2006-2007. Although ownership data on CDOs
is extremely prohibited as such securities are privately placed, the minibond incident
3See Wilkens and Stoimenov (2007), Henderson and Pearson (2008), and Bergstresser (2008).
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provides a unique opportunity to examine such investment decision.
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy unveils that many structured products investors
in Hong Kong are likely to lose their investment significantly. Hence, they gather to-
gether and often hold demonstrations to ask for government intervention. Through
those occasions we interviewed 783 investors and collected comprehensive data about
their demographic background and transaction details over the period of January to
June 2009. Our subjects include not only minibond and constellation investors, but also
equity-linked notes (ELN) investors who bought ELNs issued by or linked to Lehman
Brothers via over-the-counter transactions. Investors are willing to share information
with us as they want to draw more attention and investigation. We augment investor
information with detailed description of structured products compiled by Securities and
Futures Commissions (SFC), which is the securities market authority of Hong Kong and
government body investigate the incident.
Our first finding is that most product characteristics are not associated with invest-
ment decisions. Investors did not invest more fraction of their wealth in higher premium
products. Counter-intuitively, given the same level of premium and other product char-
acteristics, investment amount increases with the true riskiness of the product. Those
products are so complex that the true riskiness can be overshadowed by the perceived
(false) safeness. The only other significant product characteristic is coupon payment
frequency. All else equal, investors preferred products with more frequent coupon pay-
ments, while payment frequency plays little role in asset allocation theories. Those
findings may appear puzzling but could be consistent with issuer’s successful extraction
of consumer surplus.4 The explanatory power of product characteristics for allocation
decision is limited, with an adjusted R2 of 2.5% in the regression using all prominent
product features.
Investor background also did not matter much. Investor spending on lottery tick-
ets, our measure of risk aversion, is statistically insignificant in explaining investment
proportion in structured products. Life cycle variables such as age, employment, mar-
riage, and gender are also insignificant. Financial background has some effect. High
income earners and homeowners made significantly less investments in structured prod-
ucts. Such findings are also puzzling because, regardless whether we treat structured
products as risky assets or safe assets, investor profile variations should differentiate
4It is interesting to note that at the beginning US dollar denominated minibonds and HK dollar
denominated minibonds have the same coupon rate but different coupon rates for later issues, although
HK dollar is pegged to US dollar.
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investment allocations, through the argument of “revealed preference”. Again, adjusted
R2 from investor background variables is merely 4.3%. We further consider transaction
environment and market conditions. To our surprise, investors who are more trusting
the distributors and more familiar with salespeople bought significantly less. Neither
equity market condition nor credit market condition matters much.
Combining the effects of product characteristics, investor background, transaction
environment, and market condition only produces an adjusted R2 of 6.9%. Most of the
economically important variables turn out to be insignificant. It is difficult to tell a
demand story from our findings. Hence, investments in structured products are more
likely to be “pulled” by the issuers. In such case, will individual investor financial lit-
eracy be effective in attenuating the influence from the supply side (e.g., sales pitch)?
We hypothesize that more financially literate investors are better positioned to fend off
investment sophistry. Our measure of financial literacy is related to reasonable expecta-
tion of stock returns in Hong Kong market. We expect more financially literate investors
will behave more consistently with rational expectation based theories. In the case of
retail structured products, ambiguity averse investors would participate less. Empiri-
cal results are consistent with such prediction: Financially literate investors buy about
10% less structured products. This finding is robust to alternative measures of financial
literacy.
Next we investigate the channels through which financial literacy works. The blossom
of financial engineering and the field of mathematical finance in recent years suggests
that calculating ability can be important for investment. However, we find that, while
individually both calculation and comprehension capabilities are important, jointly com-
prehension has more important effects. Hence, improving investor’s understanding of
the market seems to be a good lesson learned from this structured product experience
(mathematical skills are arguably more related to IQ). However, the premise is that
investors can learn. If better investment decisions are due to intelligence which can
hardly be improved upon training, then investor education programs will not be useful.
Therefore, it is important to know which components of financial literacy, education
or intelligence (IQ), will help investors make better investment decisions. We find that
both education and IQ have significant effect on allocation decisions with control for
other factors. Moreover, education seems to be relatively more important with a higher
stand-alone adjusted R2 (9.9%) than IQ (adjusted R2 2.6%). Our findings on finan-
cial literacy, cognitive ability, education, and IQ are robust across investor groups and
product types. Moreover, these results survives after controlling for Heckman’s sample
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selection bias.
In his American Finance Association (AFA) Presidential Address, Campbell (2006)
summarizes empirical evidence on household finance and argues that poorer and less
well educated make investment mistakes. Furthermore, he believes that some financial
products exist to exploit naive investors. Our empirical evidence supports his conjecture.
At household level for Hong Kong structured product investments, risk-return tradeoff
is not the main decision metric, financial literacy plays a bigger role. However, we
also point out that some very well educated investors all invest in such products and
that the highest adjusted R2 explaining structured product investments is less than
20%. Therefore, the majority of cross-sectional variations in investor decision is not
identified. Either investors made random decisions or distributors were overly successful
in marketing/selling. Currently our data cannot distinguish those two scenarios. While
bounded investor rationality may have played some role in the structured products
market, investor demand of such products (the “push” effect) was not the driving force
for market growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We first discuss our motivation relative
to the existing literature in Section II. In Section III we describe the structured product
market with a focus on Hong Kong market. Data and sample characteristics are pre-
sented in Section IV. Our main empirical analyses on investment allocation are provided
in Section V. Robustness checks are supplied in Section VI. Section VII summarizes our
findings and concludes.
2 Related Literature
The investment literature often assumes good behavior from all market players: security
issuers design a new product to improve social welfare, financial intermediaries truthfully
transmit information about the products, investors understand the product and execute
the best strategy. It is an empirical issue whether these conditions are met in reality.
The best evidence is from laboratory experiments and field experiments. For example,
Charness and Levin’s (2005) lab experiments show that investors over-extrapolate from
their former experience and tend to follow a suboptimal reinforcement strategy. Choi,
Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2009) substantiate such result using individual 401(k)
investment data. Kaustia and Knupfer (2008) have similar findings for individual IPO
investors. Asparouhova, Bossaerts, Eguia and Zame (2009) show that investor’s cognitive
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biases hinder information updating, lead to perceived ambiguity, and cause deviation
from rational decision marking.
Above studies are on stocks or familiar investment vehicles. The findings may not
generalize to financial innovations such as structured products. We examine how indi-
vidual investors actually make allocation decisions over new illiquid financial products,
which is part of household finance that needs more empirical research as advocated by
Campbell (2006). Although Das and Statman (2009) argue that structured products can
help improve portfolio allocation, several recent studies suggest that retail structured
financial products are persistently overpriced by about eight percent (see Henderson
and Pearson (2008), and Bergstresser (2008)). A natural question is how the issuers
get investors to buy large amount of such overpriced products. Investors have little
prior knowledge about those investments. Theories on choice under ambiguity would
imply zero participation in such case. Hence, market frictions might have existed to defy
compliance with theoretical predictions. Subrahmanyam (2009a) shows that financial
intermediaries such as distributing banks may delay educating inexperienced individual
investors in order to earn more commissions. Moreover, Carlin and Manso (2009) argue
that firms may strategically use product complexity to extract consumer surplus. Our
empirical results will shed light on the existence of such frictions.
How can individual investors make best investment decisions in a market flourished
with financial innovations issued by strategic financial intermediaries? One answer is
market selection. Only those good at financial securities (financially literate) should
be participating. However, Hilgert, Hogorth and Beverly (2003), Agrew and Szykman
(2005), National Council on Economic Education’s report (NCEE 2005), show that
most Americans fail to understand basic financial concepts and conditions of financial
instruments, such as consumer loan and mortgages. More recently, Lusardi and Mitchell
(2006, 2008) report a wide-spread lack of ability on interest compounding among older
(50+) individuals in the U.S. Lusardi and Tofano (2009) show a lack of knowledge on
debt among all U.S. citizens. Similar problems of low financial literacy are also found
in other countries.5
More importantly, lack of financial literacy influences individual suboptimal saving
and portfolio choices. For example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006, 2008) find that, those
who have a better understanding of compound interest, inflation and diversification are
more likely to set up plans for retirement. On portfolio choice, less literate investors
5See OECD (2005), Smith and Stewart (2008), Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2008), Moore (2003),
Miles (2004).
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are less likely to invest in stocks (van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2007), Yoong (2007),
Christelis, Jappelli, and, Padula, (2008)), and less likely to choose mutual funds with
lower fees (Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton (2008)). Similarly, Campbell (2006) reports
that individuals with lower incomes and lower education levels – characteristics that are
strongly related to financial literacy – are less likely to refinance their mortgages during
a period of falling interest rates.
Further studies have shown the channels through which financial literacy works.
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2009) use more than 1000 adults in Germany and
find that investor’s IQ, which is a usual proxy for cognitive ability, is negatively related
with risk aversion and impatience. Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2009) pro-
vide consistent empirical evidence on a strong correlation between IQ and stock market
participation using data from Finland. A conceivable way to improve financial literacy
is education. Berheim, Garrett, and Maki (1997) show that, in states with mandates
of financial education curriculum in high school, students five year after graduation on
average have saving rates that are 1.5 percent higher than students from other states.
Bayer, Berheim and Scholz (2008) provide evidence that the frequent seminars increase
both participation rates and contribution rates for non-highly compensated individuals.
The author conclude that this can only provide limited support for the effects of finan-
cial education on retirement savings. Woodward (2003) shows that college education is
associated with a remarkable $1,500 reduction in average broker fees for mortgage loans.
Campbell (2006) suggests that more of household with high education level should par-
ticipation in stock market, since they are more likely to overcome the barrier of not
knowing the existence of equity markets, and fixed costs to enter the market. He also
shows that higher educated investors are less likely to make mistakes in the market.
Similar results have been found be Luigi and Jappelli(2005) who show that education is
related to individual awareness of stocks. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006, 2008), Lusardi and
Tofano (2009), Stango and Zinman(2009) also suggest that more education to improve
financial literacy is needed.
However, while it is easy to reach consensus on financial literacy, discontent exists
on the effectiveness of education. Heckman (2006) argues that the relationship between
cognitive and non-cognitive skills is complex, such that non-cognitive skills and person-
ality traits could cause people to endogenously create environments during childhood
that foster faster cognitive development. Education has less effect on cognitive ability
when it is given later, an may provide little help on their decision making. The data
on Hong Kong household investments in structured financial products provide a perfect
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setting for us to investigate above issues. We shed light on investor behavior in a new
market of illiquid securities (with plenty of ambiguity). Our results on financial literacy,
cognitive abilities, IQ, and education will help resolve some of the theoretical debates.
3 Market for Retail Structured Financial Products
Structured financial products, characterized by customized payoff streams and illiquid
secondary market, have become increasingly important investment vehicles. The most
well known structured product is probably collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which
are the key driver of the recent credit market boom (2005-2007) and bust (2007-2009).
(See Brunnermeier (2009) and Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) for overviews.) How-
ever, given the extremely high requirement of minimal investment in CDOs, individual
investors can hardly afford to purchase such products. Hence, investors in Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Singapore were shocked when they were informed of their holdings in retail
structured financial product issued or related to the failed Lehman Brothers.
At the time of Lehman Bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, HKD20.173 billion
structured products associated with Lehman were still outstanding in the market from
43,707 investment accounts.6 Two types of structured products are affected to Lehman
bankruptcy: credit-linked note (CLN) and equity-linked note (ELN). The most publi-
cized is the “minibond” CLN issued by Lehman Brothers. Another noteworthy CLN is
the constellation issued by Development Bank of Singapore (DBS). Appendix II provides
detailed issuance information on minibond and constellation. The investment in these
three groups of products take 97% of the total investment in Lehman Brothers related
products.
Figure 1 shows the structure of CLNs and ELNs. CLNs are medium-term notes issued
by financial institutions. Their payouts are based on a group of companies’ (“reference
entities”) credit performance. Those notes normally have 3 to 5 years investment horizon
with coupon rates slightly higher than quarterly bank deposit rates. However, the risks
of CLNs come from multiple sources. The first risk of this product comes from underlying
collateral. When investors purchase the minibond, issuer will use the proceeds collected
from investors to buy CDOs as underlying collateral for the minibond. When there is
an event of default for collaterals, minibond with be redeemed early at the price based
6“List of information/ documents requested by Members”, Hong Kong legislative Council,
www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/english/hc/papers/hc1013cb2-100-3-e.pdf
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on the proceeds of selling the collateral assets (so called “early redemption amount”),
which may be significantly below the principal amount of the minibond outstanding. The
second risk is swap counterparty risk. The issuer signs swap contracts to hedge currency
risk and interest rate risk. Swap counterparty takes the yields from the underlying
collaterals and provides fixed coupon payment to the investors. But when default of
swap counterparty occurs, minibond will also be redeemed at the early redemption
amount. Finally, the investors’ position as insurer in the swap leads to another risk.
Lastly, the swap is based on the credit performance of the reference entities (normally 5
to 8 names). For the case of minibond, the credit rating for these reference entities may
range from AA+ to BBB. If any of these reference entity goes bankrupt, fails to pay its
liability, or is restructured, minibond will be redeemed at an amount based on selling
of the subordinate debt of that in-troubled reference entity. In this case, investors may
lose most of their investments. We summarize the payoff function per share of CLNs,
take minibond series 35 for example, as follow:
f(x) =

1 + it : if issuer exercise call option before maturity date;
x : if early redemption event occurs;
rj : if credit event occurs on reference entity j;
1 + 5.6% : if nothing happens.
Where it is the cumulative interest rate before the day issuer exercise call option; x is
the value of collateral when early redemption event occurs; rj is the recovery rate of the
subordinated debt of the reference entity at credit event.
For equity-linked notes, as illustrate in Figure 1, investors also suffer the underlying
collateral risk and swap counterparty risk. The key difference in the structure of ELNs
with that of CLNs is that the swap is linked to the stock price of a basket of (normally
3 to 6) companies. Figure 2 shows how the payoff of ELNs is linked to the stock price of
the reference companies. Take Pyxis Series 21, an ELN issued by Lehman Brothers on
May 2007, for example. The investment horizon of the note is 2.5 years. Coupon will be
paid every half a year after issuance at the observation dates. During each of the second
to fifth observation dates, there are four auto-calls by the issuer. If the closing price on
observation date is at or above 96% of fixing price (equity to the stock price when the
note is issued), the note will be redeemed. This auto-call structure together with the
fixed coupon rate put a “cap” on the payoff. In the best scenario, investor will get a
20% return when the note matures. However, when the stock price of any of the linked
companies fall below 75% of the fixing price at any day within the 2.5 years, investor
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will have to wait until the maturity date to get back principal. Moreover, when default
under the underlying collateral or swap counterparty occurs, the note will also have to
be redeemed early at an amount based on the proceeds of selling the collateral, which
may be significantly lower than the principal.
Unlike those structured products examined by Henderson and Pearson (2008), re-
tail structured financial products are not listed on any exchange in Hong Kong. All
transactions are executed over the counter at a distributing bank. Once issued, most of
the structured products are not priced until maturity or when knock-out events, such as
credit event for CLNs, occur. There is no way to track the performance and market value
of such products. Hence, it is difficult for investors to form expectation about the risks
and returns of such products. There is no secondary market for those products. Initial
investors likely have to hold the products till maturity. The relatively long maturity, 3
to 5.5 years for CLNs and 2 years for ELNs, makes investment in such products even
riskier. Overall, it seems difficult for investors to get a good handle of such investments.
We use survey data to explore the key motives for investors to purchase these products.
4 Data and Sample Description
4.1 Data Collection
We obtain data from investors of Lehman related structured products through individual
interviews. The interviewers are University of Hong Kong students, mostly Cantonese
speakers. The interview will go over a list of items on a questionnaire designed by our-
selves. The interviews were conducted during the 11 times of the large protests and
gatherings by investors between January 15 and May 22, 2009. Our sample consists
of data from 783 structured product investors. The interviewers randomly selected the
interviewees and asked questions face-to-face. Our questionnaire has three sections:
investment decision characteristics, investor financial characteristics, and investor de-
mographic characteristics. On March 14, 2009, we revised our questionnaire by adding
questions on family monthly income, homeownership, whether they are familiar with
salesman, and a question on simple calculation, without changing the original questions.
The sample is roughly evenly distributed: 430 investors surveyed before March 14 and
353 investors surveyed after March 14, 2009.
In order to examine sample selection issue, we further interviewed a group of in-
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vestors who did not invest in Lehman related structured products as control sample.
Those interviews were conducted between July 24 and August 10, 2009. We used simi-
lar questionnaire, with minor change on the questions in investment decisions. We chose
to conduct the surveys in 11 districts of Hong Kong where most of the Lehman struc-
tured product investors live to control for geographic factors. We randomly selected
75 investors in those areas, such as from streets, parks, or from railway stations, and
obtained similar information on demographic, financial, and investment characteristics.
Figure 3 illustrates a pattern of co-movement between total investments in minibonds
from the subjects in our sample and Hang Seng Index (HSI) from July 2, 2003 to June
30, 2008. Presumably investors have more to invest in structured products when equity
market condition is good. Notably, as shown in Appendix II, the largest group comes
from investors of minibond series 35B issued on February 22, 2008, at a time financial
crisis was going strong.
4.2 Sample Description
Table I presents descriptive statistics of our key variables (definitions are given in Ap-
pendix I). Respondents report the name of the structured products they purchased and
the proportion of their total financial wealth that they invested in the structured prod-
ucts. Their average monthly income is HKD17,700. On average, each investor made
HKD1.04 million (59% of wealth) investment in such products. Only 31% of the sub-
jects ever bought lottery tickets., 40% of them buy stocks with average holding of 15%,
82% own properties. About 62% of the investors were familiar with the salespeople,
86% investors closed the deal on the spot while 14% took the documents back home and
purchased after some consideration. About 42%, 38%, 9% investors purchased through
Bank of China (Hong Kong).
Our sample contains all of the three main structured products that are related to
Lehman Brother, namely Minibond, Constellation and equity-linked notes (ELN here-
after). The differences between ELN investors and CLN investors are substantial. ELN
investors are better educated, with 2 more years of education on average, and more afflu-
ent than CLN investors in both total financial wealth and family monthly income. The
average self-reported investment proportions by investors of each group are all above
50%. Financial and demographic characteristics show that these investors are basically
senior and poorly educated people. The average age is above 55; more than 70% of them
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are retired, and only 15% attended college. More than a quarter of the investors cannot
read, and about two thirds of them cannot do simple calculation.
A key variable to our analysis is investor’s self-reported expectation of Hong Kong
stock market annual return which we use as a proxy for financial literacy. Among the
353 interviewees we asked for their expectation, 159 cannot answer. The histogram of
answers from the other 194 investors is plotted in Figure 4. Unsurprisingly, investors
tend to choose sentimental numbers such as 0% (25 responses), 5% (30 responses), 10%
(48 responses), 20% (20 responses), but there is also wide dispersion among the answers.
Panel A of Figure 5 shows that the wealth invested in structured financial products is
high in groups sorted on their stock return expectation. The investment proportions are
all higher than 50%. However, those who can give more reasonable expectation to Hong
Kong stock market annual return (the third group) on average put less proportion of
wealth in purchasing structured financial products.
Panel B of Figure 5 shows that the proportion of financially literate investors de-
creases as the investors’ investment proportion increases. Among those who have in-
vested less than half of their wealth in structured products, there are significantly more
literate investors than non-literate investors. However, this difference decreased and re-
versed in the group of people who invested more than half of their wealth in structured
products. Panel C of Figure 5 shows that investment proportion in structured products
first increase and then decrease as we move from low income investors to high income in-
vestors. Investors of middle income level invest more proportion of wealth in structured
products. Within each group, the financially illiterate investors invest more proportion
of their wealth than literate investors.
5 Empirical Results on Allocation
5.1 Fundamental Determinants
Conventional mean-variance portfolio allocation theories suggest that investment deci-
sion in risky assets θ is determined by
θ =
E(µ)− rf
γσ
, (1)
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where E(µ)−rf is risk premium or expected return over risk-free rate, σ is risk, and γ is
investor risk aversion. Investment proportion increases with risk premium but decreases
with risk. More risk averse investors will allocate less to risky assets. When we adapt
above predictions to structured notes, we need to have a precise mapping to conventional
investments according to description of product characteristics. In particular, structured
notes mostly are linked to multiple names with different credit ratings. The number of
reference names and their ratings can be informative of the risk and return of the CLNs
and ELNs.
Specifically, we consider the premium of the product over Libor rate. The highest
rating of the reference entities as well as the lowest rating of the reference entities,
resulting a rating range (Max-Min rating). The maturity of the product is used to
capture the term structure in premium and liquidity clientele effects. Furthermore,
number of reference entities and coupon payment frequency are often emphasized in the
product prospectus. The products are either denominated in Hong Kong dollar or U.S.
dollar. We separate CLNs from ELNs.
Additional to security’s risk and return and investor’s risk appetite, factors related
to investment environment may also affect asset allocation decisions. In particular, we
consider the relationship between distributing bank and investor to capture the trust
effect. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) show that less trusting investors buy less
stocks using Italian and Dutch data. Trust is measured in three ways: a dummy variable
which equals one if the investor has ten years or longer relationship with the distributing
bank, investor’s self report trust (from 1 to 5) level at the time of purchase, a discrete
variable which equals 3 if the salesperson is a personal friend of the investor, 2 if the
investor is acquainted with the salesperson, and 1 if investor did not have previous
interaction with the salesperson.
We also consider other factors such as market conditions and investment oppor-
tunities which intertemporal asset pricing models such as Merton (1973) suggest are
important. Specifically, we consider Hong Kong Interbank Borrowing Rate (Hibor) for
credit market condition and Hang Seng index trailing quarterly return for general eq-
uity market condition. These macroeconomic variables may also account for some of the
effect of investor sentiment and information uncertainty.
Table II reports our baseline results on fundamental determinants of structured prod-
uct allocation. In model 1, we include only product characteristics capturing the risk,
return, and type of the security. We find that investors allocate more to structured prod-
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ucts with more frequent coupon payments and wider range of reference entities. The
latter finding is puzzling as products with wider range are riskier. It may seem surprising
that investors’ allocation does not depend on the premium. However, this is expected
result in equilibrium of successful marketing strategy. The issuers will offer minimum
return in order to fully capture consumer surplus. Overall, the low 0.025 adjusted R2
indicate that overall investors pay little attention to product characteristics analyzed.
In model 2, we consider investor background. We proxy investor risk aversion by
lottery purchase frequency. Other variables such as age, retirement status, income,
wealth, home ownership, gender, marital status could also be related to risk aversion or
background risk (susceptibility to liquidity shocks). We find that higher income earners
and home owners are less likely to buy structured products. The economic significance
is high for the home ownership status. Moreover, a group of investors cannot recall the
details (purchase date and security type) of their investment. This group may be less
careful but this variable is insignificant. In aggregate, investor background has more
explanatory power than product characteristics with adjusted R2 of 0.043.
In model 3, we analyze transaction environment. We find that investors trusting
the distributor more and more familiar with the salespeople bought significantly less.
Whether investors bought on the spot or reconsidered has no effect. Bank relationship
is not important. Although a large group of investors bought from Bank of China, those
investors did not allocate more in structured products. In model 4, we examine the
effects of market condition or investment opportunity. We find credit market condition
characterized by Hibor rate and equity market condition characterized by Hang Seng
index 3-month trailing return are insignificant in explaining investment proportion.
In model 5, we combine the effects of product risk-return profile and investor pref-
erence. In the presence of investor background variables, rating range of the reference
names become insignificant. In model 6, we consider all above variables. Furthermore,
coupon paying frequency becomes insignificant. The adjusted R2 in the regression of
full set of explanatory variables is merely 0.069. In summary, our theorized variables
explain little of the investment decisions.
5.2 Literacy and Investment Decision
Results from previous analysis suggest that investors seem to have defied allocation theo-
ries. Therefore, the investments in structured products may not represent investors best
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desire. Then the follow-up question is, does financial literacy matter? In Table III, we
use investor’s stock market expectation to measure financial literacy. The premise is that
financially literate investors should be able to form reasonable expectation about stock
returns. We find that indeed, more financially literate investors purchased about 10%
less structured products, controlling for other determinants. Alternatively, financially
literate investors may invest in risky assets including stocks, we find similar supporting
evidence in Table IV. It is worth pointing out that the effect from financial literacy
drives out other effects except trust in distributing bank.
Literacy can be driven by two factors: calculation and comprehension. In Table V
we find that both components are important individually. Moreover, they have substan-
tially more explanatory power relative to other variables. Stand-alone adjusted R2s are
4.5% for calculation and 9.7% for comprehension. However, counter-intuitively, com-
prehension rather than calculation seems to be relatively more important. Financial
literacy is still significant after controlling calculation and comprehension. Hence, fi-
nancial literacy may reach beyond conventional literacy measured by cognitive abilities.
The importance of literacy, calculation, and comprehension is further demonstrated by
the increased adjusted R2 from 0.069 to 0.185. Additionally, investor income and home
ownership become insignificant in the presence of literacy variables.
5.3 Effects of Education and IQ
If financial literacy has significant effect on investment performance, improving investor
financial literacy through education programs seems to be a promising route to pursue.
However, the result may not be encouraging if literacy is mostly determined by individual
intelligence which cannot be materially affected by training. Ehrlich, Hamlen, and Yin
(2008) use micro-level data to show that more educated households invest more in risky
assets and obtain higher returns. Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2009b) show
that IQ affects stock market performance. In this subsection, we separately explore
these two potential drivers of literacy effects.
Table VI show that investors with high school or above education bought 11% to 14%
less structured products. This negative relationship between education and structured
product investment prevails when we measure education by number of schooling years.
Furthermore, education effect is robust to controlling for literacy and its two components
calculation and comprehension. However, marginal explanatory power of education
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is limited as adjusted R2 is little changed with the inclusion of education. Although
education has a stand-alone adjusted R2 of 0.06, its effects probably correlate with
other variables.
Although education effect is strong, the casuality is unclear as smarter people tend
to perform better in school and get more education opportunity. However, we do not
have direct measure of IQ to put in as control variables. In order to examine the effect
of IQ, we construct several indirect measures. First, if a person attended high school or
college but still has limited reading skills, we presume such person has low IQ. However,
we are aware of self-reporting accuracy issue. Hence, we also define people without much
schooling but can read as high IQ. Additional measures with intermediate groups are
also used. The specific classification is included in Table VII. From correlation matrix
in Panel B of Table I, we see that our IQ proxy is highly correlated with comprehension
(correlation coefficient 0.86).
The effect of IQ is report in Table VIII. We find very strong relationship between
IQ and investment. High IQ investors purchase 16% to 24% less structured products.
Furthermore, both education and IQ are significant jointly, after controlling for product
characteristics, investor background, etc. However, the incremental R2 is minimal. It
is interesting to note that high IQ, well educated, and (relatively) financially literate
investors still purchase structured products.
6 Robustness Checks and Interpretation
Our above results on financial literacy, education, and IQ could be driven by a specific
group of investors or product. In this section, we explore whether those effects vary
across different sample selection criterion. By doing so we can verify the robustness of
our prior findings as well as explore new implications within subgroups.
6.1 CLN vs ELN
Credit-linked notes and equity-linked notes could be very different securities. Some
may argue that CLNs investors are more conservative as CLNs resemble several fea-
tures of bonds. ELNs investors are more likely experienced investors with prior stock
investments. As we see from summary Table I, ELNs bear much higher premium than
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CLNs. ELN investors are better educated with higher income. Hence, we separate CLNs
investors from ELNs investors.
Table IX shows that there are indeed salient difference across CLNs and ELNs. Liter-
acy effect is only significant for ELN investors. Male ELN investors bought 10% to 14%
less CLNs. Older ELN investors bought less. These age, gender, and literacy effects only
exist for ELNs investors. Notably, older ELN investors made less investments. There-
fore, CLN investments are more likely to be “pulled” by the issuer rather than “pushed”
by individual household investors. Note that education, IQ, and comprehension are still
significant for both groups.
For the subsample of CLNs, the rating range (max-min rating) is no longer significant.
Investors bought less high premium CLNs and shun away from CLNs with more reference
entities, after controlling for other effects. Household hold more U.S. dollar denominated
CLNs. If the investor bought under ‘consideration’, allocation proportion is about 7%
higher. Hence, investors could use some simple measures to make investment decisions.
However, the adjusted R2 is still below 0.20. Note that the negative premium effect is
highly consistent with issuer “pulling” effect.
6.2 Age and Wealth
We separate into different wealth groups and age groups. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003)
discuss whether irrational behavior would disappear with wealth. Korniotis and Kumar
(2009) examine the role of age in investment performance. Literacy, education, and IQ
may play different role under different conditions. Indeed, as shown in Table X, we
find that literacy, education, and IQ effects are stronger for the group of investors aged
50 and above. Those effects are insignificant for investors below 50. For the younger
investors, currency and income are stronger.
According to Table XI, literacy is significant for the most wealth group but not for the
highest earners. Education and IQ effects are significant for both wealthy and low income
households. Among the high income group (income in 20,000 to 99,999), structured
product investment proportion increase with lottery buying frequency. For income below
20,000 group, the income effect is positive and significant. The the most wealthy quartile,
male investors bought 23% less. Wealthy investors put less in structured products when
they bought through Bank of China Hong Kong.
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6.3 Determinants of Financial Literacy
In Table XII, we attempt to understand the driving factors of financial literacy. We
find the calculation has a stand-alone pseudo R2 of 0.147 with a very high z-score.
Other significant determinants are retirement status, which is likely correlated with age,
and home ownership. Lastly, trust in distributor is positively significantly related to
financial literacy, consistent with existing studies that more literate people are more
trusting. Note that our proposed explanatory variables for literary are reasonably well
specified with pseudo R2 as high as 0.33.
6.4 Heckman Selection Model with Control Sample
We realize that our sample may not be random. In order to control for selection bias,
we use Heckman two-stage analysis. We include subjects who did not buy structured
products in the first stage analysis to calculate the selection probability (Mills lambda),
which is then included in the second stage analysis of investment in structured products.
From Table XIII, we find that effects of literacy, comprehension, education, and IQ are
robust to the selection bias.
It is interesting that in the selection model, less educated household with low lottery
purchase frequency are more likely to be structured product investors. Female, low calcu-
lation capability, married investors are more likely to be structured products investors.
Investors more familiar with salespeople are more likely to buy structured products.
Homeowners are more likely to be investors. The selection model is reasonably well
specified with pseudo R2 of 0.469. However, some of the variables in the selection model
have opposite effects in the analysis of investment proportion. For example, more trust-
ing investors are more likely to be investors, but conditioning on investing, they put less
in structured products. Similarly, households more familiar with salespeople are more
likely to be approached but invest less. Homeowners are more likely to invest but invest
less in proportion. The inverse Mills ratio from the selection model is highly significant
with a negative sign. Therefore, selection effect is indeed at work. But our main findings
are robust to sample selection.
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7 Summary and Conclusion
Individual investors in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore bought substantial amount
of structured products which turned out to be CDOs in disguise, as revealed by the
Lehman Brother bankruptcy in September 2008. It is difficult to justify initial invest-
ment decisions in retail structured products from standard rational theories as those
investors had little prior knowledge. We consider investment decisions under ambiguity
but find mixed results. On one hand, more financially literate investors bought less
structured products. On the other hand, product characteristics such as risk premium
and risk, investor demographic background, and investor relationship with distributing
banks have little explanatory power.
All our proposed explanatory variables can only explain up to 20% of the variations
in investments. Our finding suggests that either investors made random buying decisions
or the distributors mis-sold the products for commissions. Consistent with prior studies,
our evidence suggests that improving investor financial literacy through education could
be important for the future of financial innovations. However, more vigilant market
monitoring by regulators may be equally important.
Our findings have important implications for the ongoing debate on root causes of
the credit crisis in 2007-2009. If investors did not knowingly pursue investments in
structured products, the investment banks manufacturing such products are more likely
to be the culprit of the market development and the amplification of the crisis.
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Figure 1. Structure of Credit-Linked Notes and Equity-Linked Notes. The first figure shows the 
structure of Credit-Linked Notes by taking Minibond Series 35 as an example. The 7 institutions been taken as 
reference entity of Minibond Seri 35 are: HSBC Bank PLC (Aa2/AA-), Hutchison Whampoa Limited (A3/A-), 
MTR Corporation Limited (Aa2/AA), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (A1/A), Standard Chartered Bank 
(A3/A), Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited (A1/A) and Swire Pacific Limited (A3/A-). The credit ratings shown 
next to each reference entity are those applicable to the reference obligation as at 11 January 2008--shortly before 
the minibond is issued, as published by Moody’s Investors Service and/or Standard & Poor’s. The second figure 
shows the structure of Equity-Linked Notes (ELN) by taking Pyxis ELN Series 21 as an example. The 6 HK-listed 
securities are: Air China Limited, China Communications Construction Company Limited, China Mobile Limited, 
Esprit Holdings Limited, Li & Fung Limited, and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. 
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Figure 2. Payoff Structure of Equity-Linked Notes if No Early Termination Occurs. This figure 
shows the payoff structure of Equity-Linked Notes by taking Pyxis Series 21 issued on 28 May 2007 as an 
example. This figure is taken directly from the prospectus of Pyxis Series 21. The investment horizon for the note 
is 2.5 years. Coupon will be paid every half a year after issuance at the observation dates. There are four auto-calls 
by the issuer on each of the second to the fifth observation dates. Valuation date is equal to the fifth observation 
date—about 2.5 years after issue date. When the swap between issuer and swap counterparty is terminated prior to 
maturity date, the note will be redeemed at a price based on the proceeds of selling the underlying collateral, which 
may be significantly below the principal of the note. For Pyxis Series 21, the underlying collateral is European 
Medium-Term Notes issued by Lehman Brothers Treasury Co. B.V. 
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Figure 3. Market Performance and Minibond Investment. This figure shows the relation of total 
investment in each series of Minibond in our sample and Hang Seng Index. The time line starts from July 2, 2003 
to June 30, 2008. There are 637 observations of Minibond investors. Those who purchased multiple series have 
been counted multiple times. The red circle spots on the HSI line illustrate the date when each series of Minibond 
were issued. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of Expectation to Stock Annual Return. This figure shows the distribution of 
investors’ expectation to Hong Kong stock market annual return. We surveyed 783 investors, who have purchased 
Credit-linked notes or/and Equity-linked notes from February 2003 to May 2008 in Hong Kong, and randomly 
picked 353 of them to give expectation to Hong Kong stock market annual return. 194 investors responded as a 
percentage; the other 159 investors claimed that they cannot answer this question. We further constructed two 
dummy variables, “Literate Proxy1” and “Literate Proxy2”, as proxies for been financially “Literate”. “Literate 
Proxy1” equals 1 if the investor’s expectation to Hong Kong stock market annual return lies between 7% and 17%; 
“Literate Proxy2” equals 1 if the investor’s expectation to Hong Kong stock market annual return lies between 5.1% 
and 50%.  
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Figure 5. Financial Literacy and Investment Proportion. Panel A shows the average investment 
proportion of investors in 4 groups separated by their expectation to Hong Kong stock market annual return. The 
four groups are: 1. cannot answer the question; 2. expectation to stock annual return below 5.1%; 3. expectation to 
stock annual return between 5.1% and 50%; 4. expectation to stock annual return above 50%. Panel B compares 
the composition of literate investors in four investment proportion groups and composition of illiterate investors in 
four investment proportion groups. Investor is regarded as financially “Literate” if his/her expectation to Hong 
Kong stock market annual return lies between 5.1% and 50%. The sample size of both Panel A and Panel B is 311. 
Panel C categorizes literate investors and illiterate investors by their household income level, and compares their 
investment proportion in structured products in each group. There are in all 312 observations in this sample. The 
factor of income ranges from 0 HKD to 125,000HKD.  
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Table I 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A reports the summary statistics of nearly all the variables we used in the analysis from our survey sample. 
The data were collected by questionnaire survey on Hong Kong investors who purchased credit-linked note or/and 
equity-linked note from February 2003 to May 2008. We conducted the survey from February 22 to June 18, 2009, 
and obtained 783 observations in our sample. The variables of stock annual return, monthly income, own house, 
familiar with sales, calculation are added after March 15, 2009. We categorize the investors by the product type 
they mainly purchased: Minibond, Constellation, and Equity-linked Notes (ELN). All capital is measured in Hong 
Kong dollars. Panel B reports correlations matrix of all the key variables used in our analysis. “Education” refers 
to the year of education. “Trust” means the investor’s trust in distributing banks. “IQ proxy” means the Four 
Element IQ Proxy, which is defined in Table VII. A detailed instruction of the variable definitions is provided in 
Appendix I. 
Panel A: Sample Summary Statistics by Type of Invested Products 
Variables Minibond  Constellation  ELN  Total 
  Mean Obs  Mean Obs  Mean Obs  Mean Obs 
Investment Outcome:            
Investment Proportion 0.60 420  0.56 73  0.60 126  0.59 693 
Investment($mm) 0.91 456  0.67 80  1.74 144  1.04 767 
Investment Characteristics:            
Literate Proxy (Expected Stock return 7%-17%) 0.16 231  0.24 33  0.17 30  0.18 353 
Literate Proxy (Expected Stock return 5.1%-50%) 0.28 231  0.39 33  0.27 30  0.29 353 
Buy Lottery 0.29 435  0.39 75  0.29 137  0.31 727 
Risk Premium of Product 3.81 464  3.00 80  9.83 146  4.98 783 
Reconsider 0.16 442  0.05 77  0.11 129  0.14 732 
10 Year Relationship with Bank 0.57 456  0.46 76  0.41 140  0.53 757 
Trust in Distributing Banks 4.81 228  4.87 31  4.93 28  4.81 339 
Familiar with salesman 0.67 225  0.56 32  0.38 26  0.62 335 
Buy from Bank of China 0.42 464  0.38 80  0.09 146  0.34 783 
Financial Characteristics:            
Wealth($mm) 1.80 417  1.95 73  4.76 125  2.36 688 
Monthly Income($10,000) 1.61 203  1.39 33  2.52 25  1.77 312 
Own House 0.81 196  0.81 32  0.92 24  0.82 303 
Saving Proportion 0.67 344  0.59 57  0.72 94  0.68 566 
Stock Proportion 0.14 344  0.28 57  0.13 94  0.15 566 
Buy Stock 0.39 344  0.60 57  0.46 94  0.40 566 
Buy Risky Assets 0.39 464  0.49 80  0.35 146  0.38 783 
Demographic Characteristics:            
Age 56.04 459  53.51 78  54.42 145  55.53 773 
Male 0.38 432  0.33 69  0.33 114  0.37 700 
Retired 0.77 457  0.85 75  0.71 140  0.76 762 
Married 0.83 432  0.77 65  0.85 143  0.83 725 
Years of Education 9.66 451  9.97 79  11.52 142  10.14 761 
Some/finished College  0.11 451  0.10 79  0.26 142  0.15 761 
Some/finished High School 0.54 451  0.59 79  0.75 142  0.59 761 
Comprehension 0.61 454  0.72 78  0.73 142  0.65 764 
Calculation 0.31 227  0.33 33  0.38 29  0.34 348 
Number of Observations - 464  - 80  - 146  - 783 
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Table I-Continue 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
No Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
1 InvestProp 1.00                      
2 Literate1 -0.15 1.00                     
3 Literate2 -0.18 0.74 1.00                    
4 BuyStock -0.26 0.13 0.22 1.00                   
5 BuyRisky -0.30 0.14 0.20 0.77 1.00                  
6 Calculation -0.18 0.22 0.27 0.08 0.20 1.00                 
7 Comprehension -0.26 0.04 0.01 0.19 0.20 0.19 1.00                
8 IQProxy -0.13 0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.86 1.00               
9 Education -0.35 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.60 0.15 1.00              
10 Age -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.17 -0.08 -0.18 1.00             
11 Male -0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.21 1.00            
12 Retired 0.01 0.06 0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.22 -0.15 -0.20 0.39 -0.04 1.00           
13 Married -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.07 -0.01 1.00          
14 Income -0.20 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.19 0.07 0.29 -0.05 0.08 -0.24 0.10 1.00         
15 Wealth -0.09 -0.00 -0.00 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.10 -0.06 0.06 -0.07 0.03 0.51 1.00        
16 Own House -0.15 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.04 0.22 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.13 1.00       
17 BuyLottery -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.15 0.01 -0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.08 1.00      
18 RiskPremium -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.16 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.16 0.09 0.07 -0.01 1.00     
19 Reconsider 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.00 0.06 -0.00 0.05 0.01 0.08 -0.11 0.02 -0.12 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 1.00    
20 10yrRelation 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.09 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.11 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.11 -0.04 1.00   
21 Trust -0.11 -0.04 0.00 0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.11 0.06 -0.03 0.16 1.00  
22 SalesFamiliar -0.10 -0.11 -0.05 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 0.08 -0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.06 0.14 0.10 -0.07 -0.09 0.00 0.26 0.07 1.00 
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Table II 
Economic Determinants of Investment Decision 
This table shows the effects of the traditional and behavioral economic factors on investor’s decision on how 
much proportion of wealth to be invested in structured products. “Premium” is the risk premium of the purchased 
security. “Max Rating” is the maximal credit rating of reference obligation, with 9 given to AAA and 1 given to 
BBB. “#Reference Entity” is the number of reference entity. Coupon Freq. is the frequency of coupon payment, 
with 1/12, 1/4, 1/2 represents monthly, quarterly and semi-annually, respectively. “Currency” is a dummy variable 
with 1 given to U.S. dollar and 0 given to Hong Kong dollar. “Cannot Recall” is a dummy variable with 1 given to 
the investors who cannot recall either the name of the security or the date when she/he purchased the security. “10 
year Relation with Bank” is a dummy variable with 1 given to investors who have relation with structured product 
distributing banks for 10 years or more. T statistics are in parentheses, *, ** and *** represent that p<0.1, p<0.05 
and p<0.01, respectively.
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Table II - Continued 
Independent  Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Product Characteristics     
Premium -0.019    -0.014 -0.013 
 (-1.06)    (-0.78) (-0.67) 
Max Rating -0.006    0.002 -0.008 
 (-0.22)    (0.08) (-0.25) 
Max-Min Rating 0.039*    0.033 0.029 
 (1.71)    (1.45) (1.24) 
Maturity(years) -0.031    -0.025 -0.016 
 (-1.22)    (-0.95) (-0.61) 
#Reference Entity -0.028    -0.022 -0.014 
 (-1.19)    (-0.96) (-0.53) 
Coupon Freq. 0.436*    0.488* 0.438 
 (1.69)    (1.89) (1.58) 
Currency 0.047    0.036 0.049 
 (1.50)    (1.16) (1.56) 
ELN Dummy -0.083    -0.038 -0.054 
 (-0.63)    (-0.29) (-0.38) 
Investor Background     
Buy Lottery  0.022   0.037 0.019 
  (0.56)   (0.90) (0.44) 
Age  -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.18)   (-0.10) (-0.05) 
Retired  -0.024   -0.023 -0.009 
  (-0.54)   (-0.51) (-0.21) 
Income  -0.023**   -0.027*** -0.026** 
  (-2.30)   (-2.70) (-2.52) 
Own House  -0.096**   -0.093** -0.087* 
  (-2.12)   (-2.03) (-1.79) 
Male  -0.054   -0.057 -0.065 
  (-1.42)   (-1.46) (-1.59) 
Married  -0.029   0.011 -0.028 
  (-0.53)   (0.19) (-0.46) 
Cannot Recall  -0.113   -0.036 -0.016 
  (-0.98)   (-0.29) (-0.10) 
Transaction Environment     
Reconsider   0.008   0.012 
   (0.16)   (0.25) 
10 year Relation   0.046   0.034 
 with Bank   (1.20)   (0.85) 
Trust in Distributor   -0.074**   -0.092** 
   (-1.99)   (-2.44) 
Familiar with Sales   -0.075**   -0.068* 
   (-1.99)   (-1.73) 
Bank of China   -0.019   -0.044 
   (-0.55)   (-1.19) 
Market Condition     
HIBOR    -0.015  -0.003 
    (-1.11)  (-0.17) 
HSI Quarterly    -0.001  -0.002 
Return    (-0.72)  (-1.03) 
Constant 0.774*** 0.798*** 0.986*** 0.647*** 0.792*** 1.289*** 
#Obs. 250 247 244 252 245 237 
Adj. R² 0.025 0.043 0.014 0.002 0.066 0.069 
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Table III 
Financial Literacy and Investment Decision 
This table reports the effects of financial literacy on investment decision making. We construct two dummy 
variables as proxies for the investors been financially “Literate”. In the regressions at the left side, “Literate” 
equals 1 if investor’s expectation to Hong Kong stock annual return lies between 7% and 17%. In the regressions 
at the right side, “Literate” equals 1 if investor’s expectation to Hong Kong stock annual return lies between 5.1% 
and 50%. In column 4 and 8, we restrict the sample for only stock market non-participants.
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Table III - Continued 
Independent  Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
Variables Literate=1 if Stock Expectation ? [7% , 17%] Literate=1 if Stock Expectation ? [5.1% , 50%] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Literate -0.102** -0.062 -0.090** -0.153** -0.118*** -0.084** -0.097** -0.126** 
(-2.47) (-1.48) (-2.04) (-2.47) (-3.29) (-2.30) (-2.56) (-2.29) 
Premium -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 
(-0.69) (-0.56) (-0.37) (-0.73) (-0.57) (-0.44) 
Max Rating 0.001 -0.008 -0.075 0.002 -0.004 -0.069 
(0.03) (-0.26) (-1.64) (0.06) (-0.12) (-1.51) 
Max-Min Rating 0.031 0.025 0.034 0.029 0.025 0.037 
(1.37) (1.09) (0.95) (1.31) (1.08) (1.03) 
Maturity(years) -0.023 -0.013 -0.048 -0.023 -0.013 -0.052 
(-0.91) (-0.50) (-1.16) (-0.88) (-0.49) (-1.25) 
#Reference Entity -0.019 -0.010 0.006 -0.017 -0.011 -0.004 
(-0.82) (-0.39) (0.15) (-0.73) (-0.42) (-0.09) 
Coupon Freq. 0.493* 0.426 0.548 0.502* 0.415 0.536 
(1.92) (1.54) (1.35) (1.97) (1.51) (1.31) 
Currency 0.031 0.044 0.045 0.036 0.051 0.063* 
(1.01) (1.40) (1.25) (1.16) (1.63) (1.75) 
ELN Dummy -0.038 -0.054 -0.122 -0.027 -0.043 -0.148 
(-0.29) (-0.38) (-0.58) (-0.21) (-0.30) (-0.70) 
Buy Lottery 0.035 0.014 0.025 0.036 0.013 0.026 
(0.86) (0.34) (0.42) (0.88) (0.30) (0.44) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 
(-0.23) (-0.23) (-1.30) (-0.19) (-0.20) (-1.35) 
Retired -0.015 0.004 0.029 -0.011 0.007 0.025 
(-0.34) (0.09) (0.48) (-0.25) (0.16) (0.43) 
Income -0.025** -0.023** -0.020 -0.026*** -0.024** -0.023 
(-2.51) (-2.22) (-1.39) (-2.62) (-2.40) (-1.63) 
Own House -0.094** -0.087* -0.049 -0.089* -0.077 -0.042 
(-2.05) (-1.81) (-0.76) (-1.96) (-1.62) (-0.65) 
Male -0.051 -0.058 -0.017 -0.051 -0.056 -0.020 
(-1.31) (-1.42) (-0.29) (-1.31) (-1.38) (-0.33) 
Married 0.007 -0.038 0.008 0.017 -0.026 0.021 
(0.12) (-0.63) (0.10) (0.30) (-0.43) (0.26) 
Cannot Recall -0.048 -0.056 -0.137 -0.058 -0.062 -0.117 
(-0.38) (-0.34) (-0.62) (-0.45) (-0.38) (-0.53) 
Consideration 0.012 0.044 0.004 0.041 
(0.25) (0.68) (0.09) (0.62) 
10 year Relation 0.032 0.038 0.036 0.039 
 with Bank (0.79) (0.71) (0.91) (0.72) 
Trust in Distributor -0.099*** -0.135** -0.098*** -0.132** 
(-2.62) (-2.54) (-2.61) (-2.49) 
Familiar with Sales -0.081** -0.082 -0.079** -0.072 
(-2.06) (-1.52) (-2.04) (-1.33) 
Bank of China -0.049 -0.061 -0.051 -0.076 
(-1.33) (-1.21) (-1.40) (-1.49) 
HIBOR -0.004 -0.012 -0.004 -0.011 
(-0.21) (-0.52) (-0.20) (-0.47) 
HSI Quarterly -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
Return (-0.86) (-0.36) (-0.60) (-0.17) 
Constant 0.626*** 0.794*** 1.338*** 1.947*** 0.644*** 0.769*** 1.308*** 1.994*** 
#Obs. 252 245 237 135 252 245 237 135 
Adj. R² 0.020 0.071 0.082 0.078 0.038 0.083 0.092 0.071 
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Table IV 
 Alternative Measures of Financial Literacy 
This table reports the effects of the alternative proxies for financial literacy on investment decision making. In the 
regressions at the left side, “Literate” equals 1 if the investor buys risky assets (stock, bond, mutual fund). In the 
regressions at the right side, “Literate” equals 1 if the investor buys stock.  
Independent  Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
Variables Literate =1 if Investor Buy Risky Asset Literate =1 if Investor Buy Stock 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Literate -0.107*** -0.073** -0.060 -0.105*** -0.079** -0.075* 
(-3.09) (-2.03) (-1.61) (-2.84) (-2.07) (-1.90) 
Premium -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 
(-0.83) (-0.80) (-0.80) (-0.81) 
Max Rating 0.003 -0.008 0.002 -0.009 
(0.11) (-0.25) (0.09) (-0.29) 
Max-Min Rating 0.033 0.030 0.032 0.029 
(1.48) (1.30) (1.41) (1.27) 
Maturity(years) -0.022 -0.014 -0.024 -0.017 
(-0.85) (-0.53) (-0.95) (-0.63) 
#Reference Entity -0.025 -0.019 -0.026 -0.020 
(-1.08) (-0.71) (-1.10) (-0.78) 
Coupon Freq. 0.447* 0.410 0.461* 0.421 
(1.74) (1.48) (1.80) (1.52) 
Currency 0.039 0.051 0.037 0.051 
(1.25) (1.62) (1.21) (1.61) 
ELN Dummy -0.038 -0.060 -0.050 -0.080 
(-0.29) (-0.42) (-0.38) (-0.56) 
Buy Lottery 0.032 0.016 0.030 0.013 
(0.79) (0.37) (0.73) (0.30) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.13) (-0.06) (-0.04) (-0.02) 
Retired -0.014 -0.003 -0.020 -0.007 
(-0.32) (-0.07) (-0.45) (-0.16) 
Income -0.025** -0.024** -0.027*** -0.025** 
(-2.56) (-2.34) (-2.72) (-2.47) 
Own House -0.076 -0.071 -0.080* -0.072 
(-1.65) (-1.46) (-1.73) (-1.47) 
Male -0.041 -0.050 -0.045 -0.051 
(-1.04) (-1.21) (-1.14) (-1.24) 
Married 0.017 -0.020 0.013 -0.025 
(0.30) (-0.32) (0.22) (-0.41) 
Cannot Recall -0.035 -0.018 -0.033 -0.023 
(-0.28) (-0.11) (-0.26) (-0.14) 
Consideration 0.011 0.006 
(0.22) (0.13) 
10 year Relation 0.033 0.036 
 with Bank (0.82) (0.89) 
Trust in Distributor -0.087** -0.089** 
(-2.29) (-2.36) 
Familiar with Sales -0.066* -0.065* 
(-1.70) (-1.67) 
Bank of China -0.042 -0.045 
(-1.15) (-1.24) 
HIBOR -0.001 0.000 
(-0.03) (0.02) 
HSI Quarterly -0.002 -0.002 
Return (-1.12) (-1.19) 
Constant 0.649*** 0.811*** 1.289*** 0.635*** 0.824*** 1.329*** 
#Obs. 252 245 237 252 245 237 
Adj. R² 0.033 0.079 0.075 0.027 0.079 0.080 
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Table V 
General Cognition and Investment Decision 
This table shows the effects of investor’s comprehension ability and calculation ability on his/her investment 
decision making. Comprehension ability measures how well the investor reads; calculation ability measures 
whether the investor can do simple calculation. 
Independent Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Calculation -0.125*** -0.084** -0.113*** -0.093** -0.057 
(-3.55) (-2.28) (-2.97) (-2.36) (-1.43) 
Comprehension -0.181*** -0.157*** -0.167*** -0.157*
(-5.21) (-4.19) (-4.36) (-4.01) 
Literate -0.068* -0.086*
(-1.71) (-2.22) 
Premium -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
(-0.86) (-0.74) (-0.66) (-0.30) (-0.18) (-0.19) 
Max Rating -0.007 -0.021 -0.016 0.004 -0.005 -0.010 
(-0.25) (-0.69) (-0.53) (0.15) (-0.17) (-0.33) 
Max-Min Rating 0.036 0.036 0.032 0.033 0.028 0.029 
(1.58) (1.55) (1.38) (1.46) (1.24) (1.25) 
Maturity(years) -0.024 -0.014 -0.012 -0.017 -0.006 -0.001 
(-0.93) (-0.53) (-0.46) (-0.65) (-0.21) (-0.05) 
#Reference Entity -0.021 -0.015 -0.013 -0.020 -0.010 -0.008 
(-0.88) (-0.59) (-0.50) (-0.90) (-0.38) (-0.34) 
Coupon Freq. 0.439* 0.388 0.380 0.362 0.224 0.189 
(1.71) (1.41) (1.39) (1.42) (0.81) (0.69) 
Currency 0.036 0.048 0.050 0.026 0.043 0.045 
(1.17) (1.56) (1.60) (0.88) (1.41) (1.51) 
ELN Dummy -0.042 -0.082 -0.070 0.010 0.010 -0.002 
(-0.32) (-0.58) (-0.49) (0.08) (0.07) (-0.01) 
Buy Lottery 0.036 0.014 0.011 0.026 0.004 -0.003 
(0.89) (0.32) (0.25) (0.66) (0.10) (-0.08) 
Age 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.02) (-0.02) (-0.13) (-0.20) (-0.19) (-0.33) 
Retired -0.029 -0.015 -0.003 -0.037 -0.027 -0.013 
(-0.65) (-0.34) (-0.06) (-0.84) (-0.63) (-0.29) 
Income -0.023** -0.021** -0.021** -0.019* -0.018* -0.014 
(-2.32) (-2.08) (-2.06) (-1.92) (-1.76) (-1.40) 
Own House -0.082* -0.065 -0.063 -0.076* -0.060 -0.046 
(-1.76) (-1.34) (-1.29) (-1.70) (-1.28) (-0.97) 
Male -0.050 -0.051 -0.047 -0.045 -0.049 -0.034 
(-1.28) (-1.27) (-1.16) (-1.18) (-1.25) (-0.87) 
Married 0.005 -0.032 -0.031 0.005 -0.038 -0.033 
(0.09) (-0.50) (-0.48) (0.09) (-0.64) (-0.55) 
Cannot Recall -0.016 -0.027 -0.057 -0.069 -0.055 -0.103 
(-0.13) (-0.17) (-0.35) (-0.56) (-0.35) (-0.66) 
Consideration 0.007 0.003 -0.005 -0.011 
(0.14) (0.05) (-0.10) (-0.23) 
10 year Relation 0.018 0.022 0.031 0.021 
 with Bank (0.45) (0.55) (0.79) (0.53) 
Trust in  -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.101*** -0.111*
 Distributor (-2.70) (-2.77) (-2.78) (-3.09) 
Familiar with -0.060 -0.069* -0.084** -0.085*
 Sales (-1.53) (-1.77) (-2.21) (-2.23) 
Bank of China -0.058 -0.061* -0.034 -0.049 
(-1.60) (-1.66) (-0.96) (-1.39) 
HIBOR 0.002 0.001 -0.013 -0.009 
(0.14) (0.06) (-0.74) (-0.53) 
HSI Quarterly -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Return (-0.93) (-0.64) (-0.81) (-0.49) 
Constant 0.648*** 0.849*** 1.422*** 1.412*** 0.711*** 0.829*** 1.413*** 1.499**
#Obs. 249 242 234 234 245 238 230 227 
Adj. R² 0.045 0.079 0.097 0.106 0.097 0.142 0.158 0.185 
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Table VI 
 Education and Investment Decision 
This table reports the effects of investor’s education on their investment decision making. In the regressions at the 
left side, we use dummy variable of whether the investor has entered high school as proxy for investor’s education 
level. In the regressions at the right side, we use the investor’s years of education as proxy for his/her education 
level.  
Independent Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
Variables High School Dummy Years of Education 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Education -0.141*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.009* 
(-4.10) (-2.95) (-2.96) (-5.33) (-3.81) (-3.85) (-3.73) (-1.69) 
Literate   -0.093** -0.084** 
  (-2.51) (-2.15) 
Calculation   -0.061 
  (-1.52) 
Comprehension   -0.113** 
  (-2.39) 
Buy Lottery 0.026 0.011   0.018 0.002 -0.001 -0.008 
(0.64) (0.25)   (0.44) (0.04) (-0.03) (-0.19) 
Age -0.001 -0.001   -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
(-0.69) (-0.59)   (-0.83) (-0.75) (-0.90) (-0.65) 
Retired -0.035 -0.022   -0.033 -0.018 -0.003 -0.012 
(-0.80) (-0.50)   (-0.75) (-0.42) (-0.06) (-0.27) 
Income -0.022** -0.021**   -0.019* -0.018* -0.017 -0.012 
(-2.18) (-2.01)   (-1.90) (-1.71) (-1.64) (-1.21) 
Own House -0.058 -0.049   -0.053 -0.043 -0.034 -0.031 
(-1.24) (-1.00)   (-1.15) (-0.89) (-0.72) (-0.65) 
Male -0.050 -0.057   -0.043 -0.049 -0.042 -0.033 
(-1.29) (-1.41)   (-1.12) (-1.21) (-1.06) (-0.84) 
Married 0.019 -0.018   0.019 -0.018 -0.013 -0.014 
(0.32) (-0.28)   (0.32) (-0.30) (-0.21) (-0.23) 
Cannot Recall -0.021 0.007   -0.014 0.001 -0.043 -0.085 
(-0.17) (0.04)   (-0.11) (0.01) (-0.27) (-0.54) 
Consideration 0.012   0.012 0.007 -0.003 
(0.25)   (0.24) (0.13) (-0.07) 
10 year Relation 0.030   0.023 0.024 0.011 
 with Bank (0.74)   (0.59) (0.62) (0.29) 
Trust in  -0.080**   -0.078** -0.084** -0.104***
 Distributor (-2.12)   (-2.09) (-2.28) (-2.86) 
Familiar with -0.074*   -0.076* -0.085** -0.080** 
 Sales (-1.90)   (-1.96) (-2.21) (-2.07) 
Bank of China -0.044   -0.050 -0.057 -0.056 
(-1.22)   (-1.40) (-1.62) (-1.57) 
Control for 
Product Character No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for 
Market Condition No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.681*** 0.865*** 1.312*** 0.840*** 0.971*** 1.425*** 1.437*** 1.532*** 
#Obs. 249 242 234 249 242 234 234 225 
Adj. R² 0.060 0.096 0.098 0.099 0.118 0.122 0.144 0.186 
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Table VII 
 Definition of IQ 
We construct proxies for IQ (or cognition ability) based on investor’s education level and comprehension (reading 
ability). Low IQ is defined as can only read some or cannot read after some or finished high school education, as 
illustrated in the shadow area of Panel A. There are 53 (6.98%) investors belong to this group. High IQ means 
investors who did not have access to higher education besides primary school, but can read or read some. 
Panel A: Classification of IQ 
 Primary- High School College 
Cannot Read Medium IQ Low IQ Low IQ 
 (57) (5) (0) 
Can Read Some Medium IQ Low IQ Low IQ 
 (162) (39) (3) 
Can Read High IQ Ambiguous Ambiguous 
 (93) (280) (114) 
Panel B: Definition of IQ Proxies 
Proxy Name Type Description 
Above Low IQ Dummy =1 if investor do not belong to the Low IQ category; 
High IQ Dummy =1 if investor have primary or below education but can read or read 
some; 
IQ Four Element Measured 1-4 4=High IQ, 3=Ambiguous, 2=Medium IQ, and 1=Low IQ; 
I Q Benchmark Measured 1-3 3=High IQ, 2=Ambiguous=Medium, and 1=Low IQ. 
Panel C: Correlation of IQ Proxies and Education 
 Education (years) Above High School Low IQ High IQ IQ Four Element Measured 
Above High School 0.93     
Low IQ 0.15 0.23    
High IQ -0.79 -0.85 -0.18   
IQ Four Element Measured 0.15 0.12 -0.58 0.02  
IQ Benchmark  -0.40 -0.47 -0.64 0.51 0.82 
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Table VIII 
IQ and Investment Decision 
This table reports the effects of investors’ IQs on their investment decision making. In Panel A, in the 
first column, “Above Low IQ Dummy” contains 227 of 1 and 20 of 0. In the fifth column, “High IQ 
Dummy” contains 32 of 1 and 211 of 0. In Panel B, in the first column, “IQ Four Element Measured” 
contains 16, 72, 123, and 32 of 1 to 4, respectively. In the fifth column, “IQ Benchmark Measured” 
contains 16, 195 and 32 of 1 to 3, respectively. 
Panel A: Above Low IQ, High IQ and Investment Proportion 
Independent  Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
Variables IQ Proxy = Above Low IQ Dummy IQ Proxy = High IQ Dummy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IQ Proxy -0.160** -0.238*** -0.243*** -0.236*** 0.099*** -0.148** -0.143** -0.135** 
(2.51) (3.78) (3.64) (3.58) (2.72) (-2.53) (-2.33) (-2.22) 
Above High School -0.170*** -0.140*** -0.131*** 
(-4.89) (-3.62) (-3.38) 
Education(years)   -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.032*** 
  (-5.23) (-4.16) (-3.82) 
Calculation -0.074* -0.074* 
(-1.94) (-1.91) 
Literate -0.076* -0.073* 
(-1.95) (-1.83) 
Buy Lottery 0.013 0.008 -0.012 -0.015 
(0.31) (0.19) (-0.28) (-0.36) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.55) (-0.69) (-0.58) (-0.66) 
Retired -0.024 -0.013 -0.017 -0.007 
(-0.55) (-0.29) (-0.39) (-0.16) 
Income -0.019* -0.015 -0.015 -0.012 
(-1.86) (-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.20) 
Own House -0.052 -0.033 -0.044 -0.028 
(-1.10) (-0.69) (-0.92) (-0.58) 
Male -0.061 -0.048 -0.038 -0.027 
(-1.54) (-1.22) (-0.95) (-0.66) 
Married -0.035 -0.019 -0.017 -0.005 
(-0.57) (-0.31) (-0.27) (-0.09) 
Cannot Recall -0.064 -0.108 -0.015 -0.061 
(-0.40) (-0.69) (-0.10) (-0.39) 
Consideration -0.002 -0.007 0.020 0.015 
(-0.04) (-0.14) (0.41) (0.31) 
10 year Relation 0.033 0.018 0.012 -0.002 
 with Bank (0.84) (0.47) (0.31) (-0.05) 
Trust in Distributor -0.090** -0.101*** -0.089** -0.101*** 
(-2.46) (-2.80) (-2.42) (-2.78) 
Familiar with Sales -0.069* -0.066* -0.078** -0.074* 
(-1.81) (-1.73) (-2.03) (-1.92) 
Bank of China -0.033 -0.051 -0.057 -0.072** 
(-0.93) (-1.44) (-1.60) (-2.03) 
Control for 
Product Character No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Control for 
Market Condition No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.585*** 0.677*** 1.317*** 1.414*** 0.558*** 1.043*** 1.643*** 1.727*** 
#Obs. 247 247 232 229 243 243 228 225 
Adj. R² 0.021 0.105 0.150 0.182 0.026 0.122 0.153 0.183 
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Table VIII -Continued 
Panel B: IQ Measures and Investment Proportion 
Independent  Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
Variables IQ Proxy = IQ Four Element Measured  IQ Proxy = IQ Benchmark Measured 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IQ Proxy -0.077*** -0.063*** -0.069*** -0.063*** -0.028 -0.135*** -0.140*** -0.125*** 
(-3.43) (-2.93) (-2.92) (-2.64) (-0.69) (-3.28) (-3.11) (-2.75) 
Education(years) -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.024*** 
(-5.00) (-3.42) (-3.13) (-6.32) (-4.75) (-4.24) 
Calculation -0.058 -0.057 
(-1.44) (-1.42) 
Literate -0.083** -0.080** 
(-2.13) (-2.06) 
Buy Lottery -0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.011 
(-0.13) (-0.22) (-0.18) (-0.27) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.49) (-0.63) (-0.49) (-0.62) 
Retired -0.025 -0.010 -0.022 -0.008 
(-0.57) (-0.24) (-0.50) (-0.18) 
Income -0.015 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 
(-1.46) (-1.18) (-1.41) (-1.15) 
Own House -0.048 -0.033 -0.050 -0.036 
(-1.01) (-0.69) (-1.06) (-0.75) 
Male -0.043 -0.032 -0.041 -0.030 
(-1.09) (-0.80) (-1.04) (-0.76) 
Married -0.028 -0.015 -0.028 -0.015 
(-0.47) (-0.24) (-0.46) (-0.23) 
Cannot Recall -0.047 -0.093 -0.053 -0.096 
(-0.30) (-0.59) (-0.34) (-0.61) 
Consideration -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 
(-0.05) (-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.11) 
10 year Relation 0.022 0.009 0.019 0.007 
 with Bank (0.56) (0.24) (0.49) (0.18) 
Trust in  -0.094** -0.104*** -0.095** -0.105*** 
Distributor (-2.57) (-2.89) (-2.60) (-2.90) 
Familiar with  -0.083** -0.080** -0.082** -0.079** 
Sales (-2.17) (-2.08) (-2.15) (-2.06) 
Bank of China -0.041 -0.057 -0.044 -0.059* 
(-1.17) (-1.61) (-1.25) (-1.67) 
Control for 
Product Character No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Control for 
Market Condition No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.801*** 0.989*** 1.623*** 1.689*** 0.651*** 1.180*** 1.806*** 1.846*** 
#Obs. 243 243 228 225 243 243 228 225 
Adj. R² 0.043 0.130 0.166 0.191 -0.002 0.137 0.170 0.193 
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Table IX 
Investment Decision by Product Type 
This table reports the effects of all the variables we have tested previously on CLN investors’ and ELN investors’ 
investment decision making. “Literate” equals 1 if investor’s expectation to Hong Kong stock annual return lies 
between 5.1% and 50%. All the missing variables are filled with zero and controlled by dummy variables. The 
dummy variables are not reported here.  
Independent  Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
Variables Credit-linked Note Investors Equity-linked Note Investors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Literate -0.049 -0.050 -0.237* -0.215* 
(-1.23) (-1.34) (-1.86) (-1.83) 
Calculation -0.041   -0.020 
(-1.03)   (-0.10) 
Comprehension -0.123***   -0.249*** 
(-4.69)   (-4.27) 
Education(years) -0.026*** -0.025*** 
(-7.36) (-3.69) 
IQ 4 Element -0.034** -0.080** 
Measured (-2.33) (-2.24) 
Premium -0.034* -0.033* -0.032* -0.030* 
(-1.75) (-1.71) (-1.67) (-1.66) 
Max Rating 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.015 
(0.37) (0.42) (0.38) (0.79) 
Max-Min Rating 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.011 
(0.64) (0.61) (0.69) (0.77) 
Maturity(years) -0.022 -0.021 -0.020 -0.000 
(-1.26) (-1.20) (-1.15) (-0.02) 
#Reference Entity -0.032* -0.032* -0.030 -0.038** 
(-1.73) (-1.69) (-1.63) (-2.17) 
Coupon Freq. 0.244 0.244 0.213 0.053 
(1.11) (1.11) (0.99) (0.26) 
Currency 0.047* 0.047* 0.054** 0.061** 
(1.83) (1.85) (2.16) (2.51) 
Buy Lottery 0.000 -0.002 -0.014 -0.009 0.007 0.013 0.014 0.025 
(0.01) (-0.06) (-0.49) (-0.34) (0.12) (0.22) (0.27) (0.49) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005* -0.004* 
(0.24) (0.22) (0.00) (-0.66) (-0.55) (-0.68) (-1.72) (-1.69) 
Retired 0.017 0.021 -0.005 -0.012 0.005 0.021 -0.012 -0.013 
(0.48) (0.60) (-0.15) (-0.37) (0.08) (0.35) (-0.21) (-0.23) 
Income -0.023** -0.024** -0.011 -0.008 -0.000 0.008 0.004 0.013 
(-1.98) (-2.06) (-0.95) (-0.71) (-0.00) (0.35) (0.15) (0.66) 
Own House -0.082 -0.077 -0.057 -0.032 -0.080 -0.021 -0.125 -0.028 
(-1.64) (-1.54) (-1.15) (-0.67) (-0.36) (-0.09) (-0.46) (-0.14) 
Male -0.046 -0.043 -0.033 -0.026 -0.121* -0.112* -0.142** -0.099* 
(-1.59) (-1.49) (-1.17) (-0.96) (-1.94) (-1.82) (-2.35) (-1.75) 
Married 0.006 0.007 -0.000 -0.003 -0.014 -0.012 -0.043 -0.037 
(0.17) (0.19) (-0.01) (-0.09) (-0.21) (-0.17) (-0.63) (-0.60) 
                                                                     (To be continued) 
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Table IX - Continued 
Independent  Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
Variables Credit-linked Note Investors Equity-linked Note Investors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Consideration 0.066* 0.064* 0.067* 0.065* -0.146* -0.129* -0.095 -0.102 
(1.76) (1.68) (1.81) (1.85) (-1.87) (-1.67) (-1.27) (-1.42) 
10 year Relation 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.004 -0.006 
 with Bank (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (-0.17) (0.08) (0.03) (-0.08) (-0.14) 
Trust in Distributor -0.036 -0.040 -0.046 -0.025 -0.231 -0.114 -0.212 -0.096 
(-1.02) (-1.11) (-1.33) (-0.75) (-1.13) (-0.54) (-0.98) (-0.50) 
Familiar with Sales -0.057 -0.060 -0.069* -0.074** 0.059 0.023 0.082 0.064 
(-1.42) (-1.49) (-1.77) (-1.97) (0.46) (0.18) (0.54) (0.56) 
Bank of China -0.015 -0.017 -0.009 -0.019 -0.037 -0.038 -0.062 -0.053 
(-0.56) (-0.65) (-0.35) (-0.76) (-0.40) (-0.41) (-0.68) (-0.62) 
HIBOR 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.013 -0.017 -0.017 -0.033 -0.024 
(0.34) (0.37) (0.54) (0.90) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.76) (-0.60) 
HSI Quarterly 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Return (0.37) (0.52) (0.60) (0.91) (-0.33) (-0.27) (0.13) (0.03) 
Constant 1.151*** 1.165*** 1.242*** 1.430*** 2.018* 1.467 2.450** 2.082** 
#Obs. 493 493 493 493 126 126 126 126 
Adj. R² 0.032 0.033 0.085 0.151 -0.047 -0.022 0.084 0.174 
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Table X 
Investment Decision by Different Age Groups 
This table reports the effects of all the variables we tested previously on the investment decision making of 
investors with age equal or above 50 and with age below 50. “Literate” equals 1 if investor’s expectation to Hong 
Kong stock annual return lies between 5.1% and 50%. All investors with age below 50 can report the name of 
security they purchased or/and the month they purchased the security, so we do not keep the “Cannot Recall” 
variable in the right regression since it is constant. 
Independent  Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
Variables Age 50 or above Age below 50 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Literate -0.112** -0.106** -0.123*** -0.003 -0.037 -0.051 
(-2.39) (-2.28) (-2.71) (-0.04) (-0.49) (-0.71) 
Education(years) -0.017*** -0.015** -0.022** -0.017 
(-2.68) (-2.45) (-2.10) (-1.61) 
IQ 4 Element -0.086*** -0.092* 
Measured (-3.14) (-1.73) 
Premium -0.022 -0.020 -0.020 -0.014 -0.018 -0.018 0.002 -0.006 
(-0.98) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.64) (-0.38) (-0.36) (0.05) (-0.12) 
Max Rating -0.009 -0.010 -0.001 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 0.019 0.035 
(-0.25) (-0.26) (-0.04) (-0.30) (-0.24) (-0.23) (0.33) (0.62) 
Max-Min Rating 0.030 0.027 0.024 0.029 0.039 0.039 0.008 -0.012 
(1.06) (0.98) (0.86) (1.08) (0.78) (0.76) (0.17) (-0.24) 
Maturity(years) -0.004 -0.003 0.005 0.015 -0.038 -0.038 -0.005 -0.034 
(-0.14) (-0.09) (0.16) (0.49) (-0.64) (-0.63) (-0.09) (-0.56) 
#Reference Entity -0.042 -0.037 -0.040 -0.032 0.044 0.044 0.028 0.014 
(-1.31) (-1.17) (-1.30) (-1.06) (0.75) (0.74) (0.49) (0.24) 
Coupon Freq. 0.257 0.241 0.123 -0.021 0.589 0.586 0.331 0.439 
(0.79) (0.75) (0.38) (-0.07) (0.84) (0.82) (0.48) (0.62) 
Currency 0.035 0.040 0.036 0.029 0.168** 0.168** 0.171** 0.192** 
(0.98) (1.12) (1.02) (0.85) (2.07) (2.04) (2.16) (2.53) 
ELN Dummy -0.137 -0.138 -0.074 -0.065 0.285 0.285 0.309 0.300 
(-0.79) (-0.81) (-0.44) (-0.40) (0.81) (0.80) (0.90) (0.87) 
Buy Lottery 0.003 -0.005 -0.022 -0.031 0.082 0.082 0.078 0.046 
(0.06) (-0.10) (-0.41) (-0.59) (1.07) (1.06) (1.04) (0.62) 
Income -0.018 -0.017 -0.012 -0.007 -0.067** -0.067** -0.049* -0.038 
(-1.58) (-1.55) (-1.04) (-0.67) (-2.52) (-2.49) (-1.80) (-1.44) 
Own House -0.061 -0.051 0.020 0.017 -0.037 -0.037 -0.056 -0.094 
(-0.98) (-0.83) (0.31) (0.27) (-0.46) (-0.45) (-0.70) (-1.20) 
Male -0.060 -0.043 -0.036 -0.007 -0.078 -0.078 -0.040 -0.059 
(-1.24) (-0.89) (-0.73) (-0.15) (-0.96) (-0.95) (-0.49) (-0.73) 
Married -0.021 -0.014 0.021 -0.008 -0.122 -0.122 -0.106 -0.047 
(-0.27) (-0.17) (0.26) (-0.10) (-1.07) (-1.06) (-0.95) (-0.43) 
Cannot Recall -0.065 -0.103 -0.077 -0.147 
(-0.37) (-0.59) (-0.45) (-0.89) 
                       (To be continued) 
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Table X - Continued 
Independent  Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
Variables Age 50 or above Age below 50 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Consideration -0.011 -0.031 -0.043 -0.083 0.049 0.049 0.078 0.054 
(-0.17) (-0.47) (-0.63) (-1.24) (0.64) (0.63) (1.02) (0.73) 
10 year Relation -0.010 0.007 -0.005 -0.006 0.148** 0.147* 0.112 0.089 
 with Bank (-0.18) (0.13) (-0.10) (-0.11) (2.06) (1.94) (1.51) (1.24) 
Trust in Distributor -0.090* -0.094** -0.082* -0.098** -0.099 -0.099 -0.072 -0.110 
(-1.96) (-2.06) (-1.81) (-2.25) (-1.33) (-1.31) (-0.98) (-1.54) 
Familiar with Sales -0.076 -0.087* -0.091* -0.109** -0.108 -0.108 -0.147** -0.143** 
(-1.53) (-1.77) (-1.86) (-2.29) (-1.56) (-1.53) (-2.09) (-2.04) 
Bank of China -0.048 -0.055 -0.067 -0.064 -0.087 -0.087 -0.095 -0.063 
(-1.08) (-1.24) (-1.52) (-1.49) (-1.14) (-1.12) (-1.27) (-0.87) 
HIBOR -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.021 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.019 
(-0.22) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.99) (0.02) (0.01) (0.25) (0.54) 
HSI Quarterly -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
Return (-1.03) (-0.75) (-0.63) (-0.71) (-0.58) (-0.50) (-0.19) (-0.42) 
Constant 1.515*** 1.517*** 1.528*** 1.860*** 1.010 1.010 0.997 1.496* 
#Obs. 176 176 172 168 63 63 63 61 
Adj. R² 0.020 0.049 0.091 0.159 0.178 0.158 0.223 0.294 
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Table XI 
Investment Decision of Different Financial Affluent Investors 
This table reports the effects of all the variables we tested on the investment decision of investors in different 
wealth and income groups. “Literate” equals 1 if investor’s expectation to Hong Kong stock annual return lies 
between 5.1% and 50%.  
Independent  Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
Variables Top Wealth Quartile Wealth Above Median Income below 20,000  Income 20,000-99,999 Everyone 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Literate -0.175** -0.165** -0.119* -0.135** -0.103** -0.108** -0.096 -0.082 -0.103***
(-2.34) (-2.22) (-1.89) (-2.25) (-2.24) (-2.44) (-1.22) (-0.99) (-2.82) 
Education -0.018 -0.016** -0.018*** -0.010 -0.017***
(years) (-1.59) (-2.10) (-3.09) (-0.72) (-3.33) 
IQ 4 Element  -0.017 -0.070** -0.086*** -0.077 -0.071***
Measured (-0.27) (-2.00) (-3.25) (-0.89) (-3.07) 
Buy Lottery 0.111 0.134 0.019 0.021 -0.047 -0.068 0.197** 0.187* -0.009 
(1.16) (1.38) (0.29) (0.34) (-0.90) (-1.32) (2.16) (1.93) (-0.21) 
Age 0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.005 -0.001 
(0.07) (-0.39) (0.52) (-0.03) (-0.70) (-0.89) (1.48) (0.88) (-0.68) 
Retired 0.026 0.051 0.034 0.042 0.040 -0.001 -0.126 -0.074 -0.007 
(0.27) (0.48) (0.47) (0.61) (0.72) (-0.01) (-1.31) (-0.67) (-0.16) 
Income -0.026* -0.022 -0.021* -0.013 0.127* 0.175*** -0.048* -0.037 -0.013 
(-1.75) (-1.46) (-1.67) (-1.09) (1.95) (2.81) (-1.80) (-1.22) (-1.34) 
Own House -0.135 -0.099 -0.106 -0.103 -0.073 -0.028 -0.053 -0.067 -0.038 
(-1.08) (-0.80) (-1.11) (-1.15) (-1.37) (-0.55) (-0.34) (-0.38) (-0.81) 
Male -0.231** -0.219** -0.069 -0.047 -0.042 -0.007 -0.022 -0.026 -0.033 
(-2.67) (-2.53) (-1.15) (-0.81) (-0.85) (-0.15) (-0.24) (-0.27) (-0.84) 
Married 0.123 0.153 0.006 -0.007 0.003 -0.015 -0.038 0.058 -0.024 
(0.78) (0.94) (0.06) (-0.06) (0.04) (-0.24) (-0.15) (0.20) (-0.41) 
Cannot Recall -0.315 -0.280 -0.296 -0.361* - - 0.115 0.102 -0.100 
(-1.50) (-1.32) (-1.40) (-1.82) - - (0.68) (0.58) (-0.64) 
Consideration 0.193* 0.199* 0.027 0.033 0.014 0.003 0.099 0.117 -0.010 
(1.97) (1.96) (0.37) (0.47) (0.25) (0.05) (0.72) (0.80) (-0.20) 
10 year Relation -0.134 -0.149 -0.002 -0.044 0.020 0.021 0.093 0.069 0.022 
 with Bank (-1.42) (-1.60) (-0.03) (-0.71) (0.41) (0.46) (1.23) (0.87) (0.57) 
Trust in -0.087 -0.100 -0.121** -0.124** -0.067 -0.059 -0.069 -0.075 -0.101***
Distributor (-1.04) (-1.17) (-2.10) (-2.28) (-1.36) (-1.24) (-0.97) (-1.00) (-2.81) 
Familiar with  0.010 0.019 -0.020 -0.029 -0.071 -0.107** -0.084 -0.047 -0.092** 
Sales (0.09) (0.19) (-0.30) (-0.46) (-1.57) (-2.47) (-0.96) (-0.49) (-2.45) 
Bank of China -0.217*** -0.212*** -0.139** -0.140*** -0.032 -0.023 -0.099 -0.072 -0.050 
(-2.94) (-2.86) (-2.46) (-2.65) (-0.74) (-0.56) (-1.29) (-0.85) (-1.43) 
Control for 
Product Character Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for 
Market Condition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.650 1.294 1.260** 1.719*** 1.208*** 1.553*** 0.465 0.294 1.657***
#Obs. 61 60 113 108 183 175 50 49 228 
Adj. R² 0.369 0.394 0.111 0.240 0.019 0.161 0.333 0.276 0.193 
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Table XII 
Determinants of Financial Literacy 
This table shows the possible determinants of investors to be financially literate. We run probit regression on the 
two proxies for financial literacy. In the regressions at the left side, the dependent variable “Literate” equals 1 if 
investor’s expectation to Hong Kong stock market annual return lies between 7% and 17%. In the regressions at 
the right side, the dependent variable “Literate” equals 1 if investor’s expectation to Hong Kong stock market 
annual return lies between 5.1% and 50%. Z statistics are in parentheses, *, ** and *** represent that p<0.1, 
p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively. 
Independent Dependent Variable = Literate 
Variables Literate Proxy: Stock Expectation 7%-17% Literate Proxy: Stock Expectation 5.1%-50% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Calculation 1.209*** 0.838*** 0.696*** 1.375*** 0.915*** 0.745*** 
(8.14) (4.80) (4.01) (10.07) (5.74) (4.68) 
Education -0.022 -0.017 0.014 0.025 
(-0.96) (-0.66) (0.67) (1.10) 
Comprehension 0.028 0.089 -0.256 -0.214 
(0.15) (0.44) (-1.48) (-1.17) 
Buy Lottery -0.246 -0.145 -0.255 -0.136 
(-1.38) (-0.76) (-1.60) (-0.80) 
Age -0.011 -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 
(-1.53) (-1.31) (-0.94) (-0.62) 
Retired 0.358* 0.365* 0.420** 0.428** 
(1.77) (1.74) (2.27) (2.24) 
Income 0.049 0.030 0.042 0.029 
(1.18) (0.70) (1.10) (0.74) 
Own House 0.768*** 0.250 0.952*** 0.397** 
(4.29) (1.25) (6.07) (2.20) 
Male 0.239 0.259 0.247* 0.251 
(1.47) (1.49) (1.69) (1.62) 
Married -0.017 -0.120 0.199 0.103 
(-0.08) (-0.51) (1.01) (0.47) 
Trust in Distributors 0.271*** 0.259*** 
(4.36) (5.16) 
Constant -1.726*** -1.571*** -2.317*** -1.470*** -2.030*** -2.799*** 
#Obs 783 783 783 783 783 783 
Pseudo. R² 0.1471 0.2209 0.2766 0.1685 0.2822 0.3335 
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Table XIII 
Heckman Selection Model with Comparative Sample 
This table reports the results of Heckman Selection Model test. We randomly asked 75 Hong Kong citizens and 
obtained their information of all the demographic characteristics we asked before, also their relationship with the 
bank where they save money, their self-reported trust towards the banks, and their familiarity with their client 
managers. All these investors did not purchase credit-linked notes or equity-linked notes. We took this sample as 
comparative sample and ran Heckman two step regressions. z statistics is in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent 
that p<0.1, p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively. 
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Table XIII - Continued 
Independent  Dependent Variable = Investment Proportion 
 Variables Selection Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Literate   -0.091* -0.094*** -0.097*** 
  (-1.717) (-2.596) (-2.806) 
Comprehension -0.139 -0.122*** -0.133*** 
(-0.394) (-2.944) (-3.272) 
Calculation -0.426* -0.054 -0.025 
(-1.761) (-1.324) (-0.603) 
Education(years) -0.078** -0.014** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
(-1.991) (-2.103) (-2.577) (-2.690) 
IQ 4 Element   -0.058** -0.061*** 
 Measured   (-2.462) (-2.724) 
Buy Lottery -0.949*** 0.105 0.070 0.062 0.076 0.062 0.046 
(-4.043) (1.386) (1.341) (1.210) (1.209) (1.183) (0.891) 
Age 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.333) (-0.464) (-0.569) (-0.746) (-0.715) (-0.756) (-0.900) 
Retired 0.542** -0.051 -0.066 -0.046 -0.059 -0.059 -0.036 
(2.141) (-0.724) (-1.434) (-1.009) (-1.056) (-1.283) (-0.798) 
Income -0.074 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
(-1.642) (-0.283) (-0.558) (-0.525) (-0.273) (-0.426) (-0.453) 
Own House 0.564** -0.130* -0.087* -0.077 -0.105* -0.089* -0.070 
(1.988) (-1.782) (-1.692) (-1.539) (-1.736) (-1.749) (-1.432) 
Male -0.457** -0.007 -0.023 -0.016 -0.015 -0.020 -0.015 
(-1.974) (-0.109) (-0.537) (-0.390) (-0.303) (-0.468) (-0.371) 
Married 0.703* -0.068 -0.053 -0.046 -0.058 -0.050 -0.038 
(1.942) (-0.685) (-0.804) (-0.706) (-0.741) (-0.757) (-0.595) 
Cannot Recall   -0.103 -0.076 -0.124 -0.047 -0.076 -0.122 
  (-0.487) (-0.537) (-0.877) (-0.280) (-0.534) (-0.859) 
Consideration   0.004 -0.010 -0.014 0.008 -0.006 -0.011 
  (0.062) (-0.225) (-0.304) (0.147) (-0.139) (-0.240) 
10 year Relation -0.745*** 0.094 0.066 0.067 0.084 0.071 0.063 
 with Bank (-2.871) (1.408) (1.432) (1.472) (1.568) (1.598) (1.447) 
Trust in  0.776*** -0.208*** -0.170*** -0.168*** -0.174*** -0.161*** -0.154*** 
Distributor (4.802) (-3.155) (-3.743) (-3.760) (-3.158) (-3.483) (-3.401) 
Familiar with  0.486** -0.132** -0.109** -0.120*** -0.115** -0.113*** -0.118*** 
 Sales (2.089) (-2.084) (-2.523) (-2.817) (-2.298) (-2.703) (-2.897) 
Bank of China   -0.014 -0.027 -0.028 -0.035 -0.036 -0.035 
  (-0.262) (-0.742) (-0.789) (-0.795) (-0.984) (-0.977) 
HIBOR   -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 -0.016 -0.018 -0.018 
  (-0.704) (-1.098) (-1.189) (-0.820) (-1.143) (-1.144) 
HSI Quarterly Return -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (-0.161) (-0.598) (-0.239) (-0.399) (-0.517) (-0.169) 
Premium   -0.006 -0.003 -0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.001 
  (-0.239) (-0.150) (-0.027) (-0.255) (0.010) (0.072) 
Max Rating   0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.008 
  (0.013) (-0.145) (0.110) (0.058) (0.188) (0.281) 
Max-Min Rating 0.017 0.022 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.013 
  (0.501) (0.967) (0.762) (0.590) (0.658) (0.608) 
Maturity(years) -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.010 
  (-0.062) (-0.041) (0.135) (0.165) (0.297) (0.403) 
#Reference Entity -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 
  (-0.013) (-0.102) (-0.030) (-0.175) (-0.116) (-0.066) 
Coupon Freq.   0.245 0.153 0.127 0.150 0.088 0.077 
  (0.621) (0.576) (0.485) (0.474) (0.330) (0.298) 
Currency   0.067 0.054* 0.054* 0.061* 0.054* 0.053* 
  (1.465) (1.767) (1.817) (1.689) (1.760) (1.814) 
ELN Dummy   0.044 0.038 0.057 0.074 0.081 0.081 
  (0.218) (0.282) (0.426) (0.465) (0.607) (0.624) 
Constant -2.072* 1.955*** 1.825*** 1.783*** 1.910*** 1.945*** 1.897*** 
Mills λ   -0.402** -0.261** -0.242** -0.319** -0.256** -0.207* 
  (-2.526) (-2.228) (-2.089) (-2.348) (-2.200) (-1.778) 
#Obs 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 
Pseudo R² 0.4685 
χ²   30.379 72.697 81.900 47.355 73.497 85.979 
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Appendix I 
Definition of Main Variables 
This table reports the definition the key variables we used in the analysis. The data comes directly from the survey 
we conducted from February 22 to June 18, 2009. The questions addressing monthly income, monthly expense, 
estate, familiar with sales, calculation are added after March 15, 2009. The setting of Literate Proxy1 is inspired 
by the fact that the average annual return of Hang Seng Index is around 12% in the past three years (2006, 2007, 
and 2008); the setting of Literate Proxy2 is inspired by the fact that the average risk premium of structured 
products in our sample is 5%. The products can be purchased in both Hong Kong dollar (HKD) or in U.S. dollar 
(USD). We convert USD to HKD at the exchange rate of 8.0, and measure all capital in HKD. 
Variable Name Unit Definition 
Investment Characteristics  
 InvestProportion 0-1 Proportion of the investor’s asset invested in the structured product. 
 Investment $mm Amount of investment in millions of Hong Kong dollars. 
 Literate Proxy1 Dummy =1 if the investor’s expectation to stock market return lies between 7% and 
17%. 
 Literate Proxy2 Dummy =1 if the investor’s expectation to stock market annual return lies between 
5.1% and 50%. 
 Buy Lottery Dummy =1 if investor claims buying lottery more often than once half a year. 
 Reconsider Dummy =1 if the investor consider did not buy the product the day he was approached 
by the salesman. 
 10yrRelation Dummy =1 if the investor’s relationship with distributing bank is longer than 10 
years. 
 Trust Distributor 1-5 Measure of the investor’s trust in the distributing bank. 1 means completely 
doubt, and 5 means completely trust. 
 Familiar with Sales Dummy =1 if the investor is familiar the salesman of the structured product. 
 Bank of China Dummy =1 if the investor buys structured products from Bank of China. 
Product Characteristics   
 Premium Number The difference between the product’s coupon rate and fixed deposit rate at 
the product’s issuing date; premium for ELN is given as 10. 
 Max Rating Number The maximal rating of the reference obligations of each structured product. 
 Max-Min Rating Number The difference of the maximum and minimum of the reference obligation. 
 Maturity Year The maturity of the structured product that the investor purchased. 
 #Ref Entity Number The amount of reference entity or amount of linked companies. 
 Coupon Freq. Number The frequency of coupon payment. 1/2=semi-annually, 1/4=quarterly, 
1/12=monthly. 
 Currency Dummy =1 if the product is U.S. dollar type. 
 #Ref Entity Number The amount of reference entity or amount of linked companies. 
 ELN Dummy Dummy =1 if the investor buy ELN. 
Financial Characteristics  
 Wealth $mm The investor’s total financial assets. 
 Income $10,000 The investor family’s current monthly income. 
 Own House Dummy =1 if the investor owns house. 
 SavingProportion 0-1 Proportion of the investor’s asset allocated in saving. 
 StockProportion 0-1 Proportion of the investor’s allocated in buying stock. 
 BuyStock Dummy =1 if the investor buys stock. 
 BuyRisky Dummy =1 if the investor buys risky assets. 
 HIBOR Number HIBOR when the investor purchased the security. 
 HSI Quarterly 
Return 
Number Hang Seng Index quarterly return when the investor purchased the security. 
Demographic Characteristics  
 Education Years =6, 12, or 16 if the investor has finished all or some primary school 
education, all or some high school education, or all or some college 
education. 
 Age Years Age of the investor. 
 Male Dummy =1 if the investor is male. 
 Retired Dummy =1 if the investor is retired or unemployed. 
 Married Dummy =1 if the investor is married. 
 HighSchool Dummy =1 if the investor finished or finished some high school education. 
 College Dummy =1 if the investor finished or finished some college education or more 
advanced education. 
 Comprehension Dummy =1 if the investor can read traditional or simplified Chinese characters well. 
 Calculation Dummy =1 if the investor can do simple or compound interest rate calculation.
 Cannot Recall Dummy =1 if the investor cannot recall the name of security and the month when 
he/she purchased the security. 
52 
Appendix II 
Detailed Information of Credit-Linked Notes 
This table shows the detailed information of two main credit-linked notes in our sample: Minibond and 
Constellation. “Hang Seng Index” is reported as of the issue date. “Fixed Deposit Rate” and “Current Deposit Rate” 
are reported as of the month before the issue date. In panel A, The second period interest rate for Minibond Series 
11A is 8% minus six month LIBOR, and 7.6% minus six month HIBOR for Minibond Series 11B. During the time 
we conduct the survey from January 2009 to June 2009, there are 28 series of Minibond and 40 series of 
Constellation outstanding in the market. In our sample, there are 464 Minibond investors and 80 Constellation 
investors. 
Panel A: Minibond 
Series 
No. 
Issue 
Date 
#Investor 
(sample) 
Interest 
Rate  
Period1 
Interest Rate 
Period2 
Curren
cy 
Maturity  
Date 
#Referen
ce Entity 
Max 
Rating 
Min 
Rating 
Coupon 
Frequency
5 2003/07/02 3 3.8 - USD 2005/07/02 1 A- A- Semi-Ann
6 2003/09/24 2 5 8 USD 2005/09/25 150 AA- A- Annually
7A 2003/12/03 3 4.2 - USD 2008/12/03 6 AA- BBB Semi-Ann
7B 2003/12/03 10 4.2 - HKD 2008/12/03 6 AA- BBB Semi-Ann
8 2004/03/03 0 7 - HKD 2009/03/03 5 A- BBB Semi-Ann
9A 2004/03/25 2 3.7 4.3 USD 2009/09/25 6 A+ A- Semi-Ann
9B 2004/03/25 20 3.5 4.1 HKD 2009/09/25 6 A+ A- Semi-Ann
10A 2004/05/28 4 4.25 4.75 USD 2009/11/28 7 A+ A- Semi-Ann
10B 2004/05/28 17 4 4.5 HKD 2009/11/28 7 A+ A- Semi-Ann
11A 2004/07/06 5 8 8 - LIBOR USD 2010/01/06 1 A- A- Semi-Ann
11B 2004/07/06 15 7.6 7.6 -HIBOR HKD 2010/01/06 1 A- A- Semi-Ann
12A 2004/09/08 6 4.65 5.4 USD 2010/03/08 6 A+ BBB Semi-Ann
12B 2004/09/08 23 4.1 5.1 HKD 2010/03/08 6 A+ BBB Semi-Ann
15A 2004/12/28 7 4.3 5 USD 2010/06/28 6 A+ BBB+ Semi-Ann
15B 2004/12/28 8 3.3 4 HKD 2010/06/28 6 A+ BBB+ Semi-Ann
16A 2005/02/07 10 4.2 4.75 USD 2010/08/07 6 A+ A- Semi-Ann
16B 2005/02/07 10 3.2 3.75 HKD 2010/08/07 6 A+ A- Semi-Ann
17A 2005/03/09 9 4.35 5 USD 2010/09/09 7 A+ A- Semi-Ann
17B 2005/03/09 10 3.6 4.2 HKD 2010/09/09 7 A+ A- Semi-Ann
18A 2005/04/06 6 4.5 5.5 USD 2010/10/06 7 AAA A- Semi-Ann
18B 2005/04/06 9 3.7 4.7 HKD 2010/10/06 7 AAA A- Semi-Ann
19A 2005/05/26 18 4.75 4.15 USD 2010/11/26 7 AA- A- Semi-Ann
19B 2005/05/26 0 5.75 5.15 HKD 2010/11/26 7 AA- A- Semi-Ann
20A 2005/07/20 3 4.8 6 USD 2011/01/20 7 A+ A- Quarterly
20B 2005/07/20 3 4.2 5.4 HKD 2011/01/20 7 A+ A- Quarterly
21A 2005/09/15 3 5.2 6.1 USD 2011/03/15 7 A+ A- Quarterly
21B 2005/09/15 15 4.8 5.6 HKD 2011/03/15 7 A+ A- Quarterly
22A 2005/11/25 1 4.65 5.65 USD 2011/05/25 7 AA- A- Quarterly
22B 2005/11/25 2 4.4 5.4 HKD 2011/05/25 7 AA- A- Quarterly
23A 2006/02/03 2 5.35 6 USD 2011/08/03 7 A+ A- Quarterly
23B 2006/02/03 18 5.1 5.75 HKD 2011/08/03 7 A+ A- Quarterly
25A 2006/04/26 1 5.5 6.5 USD 2011/10/26 7 AA- A- Quarterly
25B 2006/04/26 11 5.3 6 HKD 2011/10/26 7 AA- A- Quarterly
26A 2006/06/30 0 5.5 6.5 USD 2011/12/30 8 AA- A- Quarterly
26B 2006/06/30 2 5.3 6 HKD 2011/12/30 8 AA- A- Quarterly
27A 2006/09/15 10 7 8.3 USD 2009/09/15 7 A+ A+ Quarterly
27B 2006/09/15 30 6.3 7.5 HKD 2009/09/15 7 A+ A+ Quarterly
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Appendix II -Continued 
Panel A: Minibond 
Series 
No. 
Issue 
Date 
#Investor 
(sample) 
Interest 
Rate  
Period1 
Interest 
Rate 
Period2 
Curre
ncy 
Maturity 
Date 
#Refer
ence 
Entity
Max 
Rating 
Min 
Rating 
Coupon 
Frequency
28A 2006/10/27 9 6.5 8 USD 2009/10/27 7 A+ A Quarterly
28B 2006/10/27 11 5.5 7 HKD 2009/10/27 7 A+ A Quarterly
29A 2006/12/21 9 6 7.5 USD 2009/12/21 7 A+ A Quarterly
29B 2006/12/21 10 5 6.5 HKD 2009/12/21 7 A+ A Quarterly
30A 2007/01/31 2 6 7.5 USD 2010/02/01 7 AA- A Quarterly
30B 2007/01/31 7 5 6.5 HKD 2010/02/01 7 AA- A Quarterly
31A 2007/04/19 3 6 7.6 USD 2010/04/19 8 AA- A Quarterly
31B 2007/04/19 8 5.5 7.1 HKD 2010/04/19 8 AA- A Quarterly
32A 2007/07/16 1 6.1 7.8 USD 2010/07/16 8 AA- A Quarterly
32B 2007/07/16 1 5.5 7.1 HKD 2010/07/16 8 AA- A Quarterly
33A 2007/08/31 2 7 9.1 USD 2010/08/31 8 AA- A Quarterly
33B 2007/08/31 12 6.3 8.1 HKD 2010/08/31 8 AA- A Quarterly
34A 2008/01/07 16 6 - USD 2011/01/07 7 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
34B 2008/01/07 50 5.6 - HKD 2011/01/07 7 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
35A 2008/02/22 19 6 - USD 2011/02/22 7 AA A- Quarterly
35B 2008/02/22 116 5.6 - HKD 2011/02/22 7 AA A- Quarterly
36A 2008/05/15 14 5.5 - USD 2011/05/15 7 AA A- Quarterly
36B 2008/05/15 49 5 - HKD 2011/05/15 7 AA A- Quarterly
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Appendix II -Continued 
Panel B: Constellation 
Series 
No. 
Issue 
Date 
#Investor 
(sample) 
Interest 
Rate  
Period1 
Interest Rate 
Period2 
Curren
cy 
Maturity  
Date 
#Referen
ce Entity 
Max 
Rating 
Min 
Rating 
Coupon 
Frequency
34 2006/03/28 2 6 6.2 USD 2009/03/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
35 2006/03/28 5 5.5 6 HKD 2009/03/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
36 2006/03/28 0 5 5.2 USD 2008/03/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
37 2006/03/28 9 4.5 5 HKD 2008/03/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
39 2006/05/26 3 5.75 7 USD 2010/05/26 8 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
40 2006/05/26 2 5.35 6.5 HKD 2010/05/26 8 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
41 2006/05/26 0 4.5 5.5 USD 2008/05/26 8 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
42 2006/05/26 1 4.1 5.1 HKD 2008/05/26 8 AA- BBB+ Quarterly
43 2006/07/28 9 6.8 8 USD 2010/07/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
44 2006/07/28 13 6.3 7.6 HKD 2010/07/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
45 2006/07/28 3 5.5 6 USD 2009/10/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
46 2006/07/28 2 5 5.5 HKD 2009/10/28 8 A+ BBB Quarterly
47 2006/09/28 0 6.3 8 USD 2010/09/28 8 AA- BBB Quarterly
48 2006/09/28 0 6 7 HKD 2010/09/28 8 AA- BBB Quarterly
49 2006/09/28 0 5 6 USD 2009/03/28 8 AA- BBB Quarterly
50 2006/09/28 1 4.75 5 HKD 2009/03/28 8 AA- BBB Quarterly
55 2006/11/22 7 6.6 8 USD 2011/11/22 8 A A- Quarterly
56 2006/11/22 6 6 6.3 HKD 2011/11/22 8 A A- Quarterly
57 2006/11/22 13 6 7 USD 2010/05/22 8 A A- Quarterly
58 2006/11/22 12 5.2 6 HKD 2010/05/22 8 A A- Quarterly
59 2007/01/10 4 5.75 6.75 USD 2012/01/10 8 A+ BBB+ Quarterly
60 2007/01/10 5 5 6 HKD 2012/01/10 8 A+ BBB+ Quarterly
61 2007/01/10 1 5.1 6.1 USD 2010/07/10 8 A+ BBB+ Quarterly
62 2007/01/10 0 4.5 5.25 HKD 2010/07/10 8 A+ BBB+ Quarterly
63 2007/02/08 5 6.2 8 USD 2013/02/08 8 A+ BBB+ Monthly 
64 2007/02/08 2 5.2 6.8 HKD 2013/02/08 8 A+ BBB+ Monthly 
65 2007/02/08 2 5 5.5 USD 2010/02/08 8 A+ BBB+ Monthly 
66 2007/02/08 3 4 5 HKD 2010/02/08 8 A+ BBB+ Monthly 
67 2007/03/22 1 6.3 8.3 USD 2013/03/22 8 A+ A- Quarterly
68 2007/03/22 0 5.6 7 HKD 2013/03/22 8 A+ A- Quarterly
69 2007/03/22 0 5.6 6.6 USD 2011/03/22 8 A+ A- Quarterly
70 2007/03/22 2 5 5.6 HKD 2011/03/22 8 A+ A- Quarterly
71 2007/05/23 1 6.6 8.8 USD 2013/05/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
72 2007/05/23 2 6 8 HKD 2013/05/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
73 2007/05/23 0 5.6 6.8 USD 2011/05/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
74 2007/05/23 0 5.2 6 HKD 2011/05/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
78 2007/07/23 2 7 9 USD 2013/07/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
79 2007/07/23 0 6.5 8.5 HKD 2013/07/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
80 2007/07/23 0 6.2 7.3 USD 2011/07/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
81 2007/07/23 4 5.7 7.2 HKD 2011/07/23 8 AA- A- Quarterly
 
 
 
